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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred under Utah R. App. P. 3, and this Court has appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1997) inasmuch as the issues
presented to this Court on appeal arise from a criminal conviction from a court of record
which is not a first degree felony or capital felony.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE 1:

Did Bhatia receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on

counsel's failure to object during the trial?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review is whether the trial court
committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996).
ISSUE 2:

Did Bhatia receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on

cumulative error?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review is whether the trial court
committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996).
ISSUE 3:

Did Bhatia receive ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure of

counsel to request a psychiatric evaluation of Bhatia?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review is whether the trial court
committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996).
ISSUE 4:

Did Bhatia receive ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel

entered into stipulations without his client's consent which stipulations went specifically to
the elements the State had to prove for conviction?
l

STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review is whether the trial court
committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996).
ISSUE 5:

Did Bhatia receive ineffective assistance of counsel in the manner in

which counsel prepared for trial?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review is whether the trial court
committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996).
ISSUE 6:

Did Bhatia receive ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel to

fail to make an opening argument prior to the commencement of Bhatia's case?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review is whether the trial court
committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996).
ISSUE 7:

Was it plain error to permit witnesses to testify as to legal conclusions?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review is whether the trial court
committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996).
ISSUE 8:

Did the prosecutor engage in prosecutorial misconduct during

the trial?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review is whether the trial court
committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996).
ISSUE 9:

Did the Court err as a matter of law by denying the motion filed by

Bhatia based on a single criminal episode?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review is that the legal conclusions of
the court are reviewed for correctness without any deference thereto. State v. Brooks. 908
2

P.2d 856 (Utah 1995).
DETERMINATIVE LAW ON APPEAL
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, rules, regulations and cases are
believed to be the determinative law of this Appeal and are attached in full in the addendum
hereto: (1) United States Constitution Amendment VI; (2) Utah State Constitution Article
I, Section 10 and 12; (3) Strickland v. Washington
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
L

Jasbir Bhatia (hereinafter "Bhatia") was charged by information with three

counts of distribution of pornographic material, pursuant to Section 76-10-1204, Utah
Code Annotated.
2.

A trial was set in this matter before a jury on February 17, 1999. See Trial

Transcript (hereinafter referred to as "TT"), cover page.
3.

Prior to the trial, various stipulations were entered into including:
a.

that an edited video was representative of the contents of all of the
videos upon which the charges were based (TT, P. 97, L. 20-21);

b.

that only evidence concerning the three charges based on the sale
of videos on April 19, 1998 and April 24, 1998 before the Court that
day would be admissible (TT, P. 6, L. 11-14).

4.

A motion to consolidate other pending cases was made, but denied by the

Court. TT,P5,L.9-17.
3

5.

Bhatia had an interpreter present during the trial.

6.

Following jury selection and some comments by the Court, the prosecutor

made his opening statement. TT, P. 91-106.
7.

During his opening arguments, the prosecutor told the jury that "unfortunately,

you have to or get to view three videos. TT. P. 91, L. 16-17. No objection was lodged by
defense counsel.
8.

Despite the stipulation that the only admissible evidence which would be

presented to the Court was the events on the dates of the purchases, the prosecutor in
opening argument told the jury that the witnesses would tell them that prior to these
incidents, "Bhatia was warned about selling pornographic videos. . . ." TT. P. 93, L. 4-5.
No objection was lodged.
9.

During opening argument, the prosecutor informed the jury that the videos

were "obviously pornographic." TT. P. 97, L. 3. No objection was lodged.
10.

When discu ung the edited video which the jury would see, the prosecutor

informed the jury "that's ten hours of pornography youfd be sitting through and we're not
sure you could drive home after something like that." TT. P. 97 L. 22 to P. 98 L. 1. No
objection was lodged.
11.

During his opening argument, the prosecutor stated, "I would like to tell you

that if s just as simple as the City proving that this stuff makes you stick to your stomach..
.." TT. P. 102, L. 15-17. No objection was lodged.
12.

Bhatia's counsel reserved his opening statement to prior to the commencement
4

of the Defense case. TT, P. 106, L. 21 to P. 107, L. 11.
13.

During the trial, Bhatiafs counsel made a motion pursuant to the doctrine of a

single criminal episode which was denied by the Court. TT, P. 167 L. 23 to P. 168 L. 8.
14.

After the trial was over, the jury was instructed and recessed to deliberate.

15.

The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all three counts. TT, P. 225 L. 23 to

P. 226 L. 8.
R

FACTUAL HISTORY RELEVANT TO APPEAL
1.

Bhatia operates a booth at the Redwood Swap Meet. TT, P. 109, L 4-5.

2.

At the trial, West Valley City Detective Kory Newbold (hereinafter

"Newbold") testified that some time in or about December, 1997 he was at the Redwood
Swap Meet checking business licenses. At that time, he believed Bhatia had videos
which were pornography. Newbold seized 49 videos but no charges were filed. TT, P.
110 L. 8 through P. 114L.4.
3.

In April, 1998, Newbold was again at the swap meet this time with Detective

Evans. TT. P. 114L. 5-12.
4.

Newbold observed Evans purchasing some videos from Bhatia. TT. P. 117

L. 12 to P. 118 L. 8.
5.

Newbold testified that he watched the videos and testified, "Once I viewed

the tape and felt that the contents was of a pornographic or harmful material, I began an
investigation . . . . " TT, P. 119, L. 23-25.
6.

Five days following the purchase of the videos at the swap meet, Newbold
5

testified that Evans called Bhatia at his residence in order to arrange to buy more videos.
TT.P. 120, L. 2-13.
7.

Newbold testified that he and Evans went to Bhatia's residence where

Newbold remained in a surveillance van. TT. P. 121, L. 5-11.
8.

Evans went into the house and carried a sack out with him the contents of

which were inspected by Newbold which he found contained three videos, "two of them
appeared to be pornographic and then the third one, just from viewing it, didn't appear to
be pornographic." TT. P. 121 L. 15 to P. 122 L. 3.
9.

Newbold testified that he was not able to find a story line in the videos.

TT.P. 125 L. 11-14.
10.

On direct examination, the Prosecutor asked Newbold, "Okay, now the

gentleman that youVe referred to as Mr. Jasbir Bhatia, is that-is this Mr. Bhatia seated next
to me, with the kind of green sweatshirt on?" TT. P. 109, L. 20-22. No objection was
lodged.
11.

Following Newbold!s testimony, an unidentified individual entered the

courtroom. Counsel for Bhatia stated, "Your honor, can I have-is there a possibility I can
have three to five minutes? I need to talk to my client, sorry to do this in the middle of the
City's case in chief, but apparently there is an issue, a potential witness that's just stepped in
and may be a witness for the defense. I'm not quite sure what he has to say, if I could have
just a minute, I don't think there's any-." TT. P. 127 L. 23 to P. 128 L. 5.
12.

At no time did counsel for Bhatia invoke the witness exclusionary rule.
6

13.

Detective Chad Evans was called to testify. IT. P. 130.

14

Evans testified that on April 19, 1998, he was working at the swap meet.

1 1 1 1 31,1.
15

8 10.
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•

• .

E\ ans testified that Bhatia offered to sell him "full version" videos. FI P.

132, L. 19.
16

Evans testified that Bhatia took him to the back of his booth and produced two

- idec»s I T !' in;;, ni , r s .
17.

Evans did not have the money to purchase tl-e \uieos hui -laicd that he

would return,,, which he did and purchased one viact
18.

I " i n s a s k e d Bhi'itiii if lir i iihlil |

••
••-

.• •
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l

- -

--25.
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IT.

P. 135 L . 7 - 1 3 .

19.

On or about April 24. 1098, Evans called Bhatia to inquire about purchasing

moie\ ideos I I I 1381 1 Il ,
20.

On direct examination, the prosecutor asked Evans, "Okay. And again, just for

housekeeping purposes, the Mr. Bhaua and Jessie "hat we've been refemng to is the
gentleman over here ,,.. the green sweater o?
that it H as

*

.

^-lectio*.-%\ as loured, kvansalnrnied
;•

.• .

21 ,

Evans went to Bhatia's residence. TT, P, 140 L I -3,

22.

Evans purchased three videos from Bhatia ' II" II" I Il

-•

events which did not occur on either April 19 or April 24, 1998 contrary to the earlier
7

stipulation. TT. P. 148 L. 12 to P. 150 L. 21. No objections were lodged.
24.

After Evans testified, the prosecution rested other than showing the

jury an edited version of the purchased tapes. TT. P. 151 L. 5-7.
25.

Prior to showing the tape, the prosecutor made several comments:
a.

"I'm not sure exactly how to delicately do that. I've been informed by
the people that are with me that they'd prefer not to sit through this,
so they will exit the courtroom." TT, P. 151, Line 12-15;

b.

"I've also been informed by the interpreter that she has some concerns,
based upon her religion and her culture, that she not be present during
it." TT,P. 151, L. 17-20.

26.

Following the showing of part of the tapes but not their entirety, Bhatia's

counsel stipulated that the portion shown to the jury was representative of the entirety of
the videos. TT. P. 160 L. 9-16.
27.

At the commencement of the defense case, counsel failed to make his reserved

opening argument. TT. P. 169.
28.

Bhatia was called as witness. TT. P. 169.

29.

On cross examination, the prosecutor stated "let's see. Didn't you sell videos

in January, 1998? Weren't they pornographic and the officers took your videos?" TT. P. 173
L. 20-22. No objection was lodged.
30.

On cross examination, when the prosecutor was asking questions faster than

they could be interpreted, the following exchange occurred:
8

THE COURT: Mr. Stoney, let it be interpreted. I want us to follow the process—
MR. STONEY: Okay.
.!..;. ,ne attorney ask the question, y en i interpi et it,
•U INTERPRETED

R iglit.

!Ht: COURT: H\en if you understand part of it, wait until it's interpreted and answer
in your native language.
I > IK ST! 'INF"\

"omul il Innni, 11ms is a sliani I \v understands ("Wi'v wmd ir'iiii saying.

TT.P. 174 L. 11-22.
31

°^> cross examination, the prosecutor asked Bhatia concerning F vans calling

puinograpi^ .
32.

i I. ± 7u L. J.
Finally, Bhatia's counsel objected to the use of the term "pornography" by the

prosecutor, staling that was "Ilk w hole i istie I
\'\
tapes as "vidu
34
' in d i d n ' t (in

was lodged. '

1111 ic ("null sustained the objection, instructing the prosecutor to refer to the
" I I V 176 I 8-9. "

.

:

^oMiig argument, the prosecutor stated,, " It s kind of interesting IKT^ ma:
' --• v J i c n In • Innk I h r stand

•

''

I X -1 * > I Innh|ivlinn

• •

•using, the prosecutor said,. " W e owe a great thanks ^ \< i-aiivuivd,
lit"' Invn tt »»itMt "cntlrm JIIIII linn fnilLn, iiiiill In ilm) (ipuLiii In mil l u x in o ill Ihi it n
house of pornography, so w c owe him a thanksforthat." TT. P. 214, L. 8-12.
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36.

In closing, Bhatia's counsel stated he was able to stipulate that the video

was representative because it was unnecessary for the jury to watch ten hours of it." TT.
P. 216 L. 20-25.
37.

In closing, when reciting the elements the prosecution has to prove, Bhatiafs

counsel told the jury to disregard the element of "serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value" stating "Disregard No. 3, because we don't know that it does not contain
and I do not profess that it does and I would be a hypocrite if I said that...." TT. P. 217
L. 18-21.
38.

After deliberation, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all three counts.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Bhatia received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to object
during the trial. There was no legitimate trial strategy which supported this failure to object.
Bhatia receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on cumulative error. Bhatia believes
that he was prejudiced in each instance by ineffective counsel but even if he was not
prejudiced by each individual incident of ineffective assistance of counsel the cumulative
effect of such conduct deprived him of a fair trial. Bhatia received ineffective assistance
of counsel for the failure of counsel to request a psychiatric evaluation of Bhatia. The
evidence was clear that Bhatia was irrational to the point of requesting the Court not set
hearings on Thursdays for allegedly religious reasons. Bhatia received ineffective assistance
of counsel when counsel entered into stipulations without his client's consent which
stipulations went specifically to the elements the State had to prove for conviction. Bhatia
10

was clearly prejudiced by such a stipulation entered into without his consent. Bhatia
received ineffective assistance of counsel in the manner in which counsel prepared for

Court room the subject of his testimony was unknown to counsel

Bhatia received

ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel to fail to make an opening argument prior to the
commencement of Bhatia's case. Counsel's laiiure prejudiced Bhatia by not alerting the jury
to his defense pi I ::)i t :> its presentatioi i
Bhatia believes that plain error was committed when the Court permitted witnesses
to testify of legal conclusions which were the ultimate issue to be determined b> the trier of
fin I

HhiiitiJi h'liOit

llic p m s m i l n i UIIIIMIU.IIIY III.IIIII/ inipiopcr pii'iudiu.il nuiniienls

throughout the trial.

da believes that it was error to permit the prosecutor to lead

witnesses thereby suggesting the answer f~ Verifications of Bhatia Bhatia believes the

episode and in permitting cross examination which was substantially beyond the scope of
direct examination.
ARGUMENT
I.

BHATIA RECEIVE D IXEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BASED
ON COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT DURING THE TRIAL.
Bhatia received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to

tt!))Qt i l i i n n i 1 Ilk1 h i l l

I In

iliiinliiiil

I! in

nlM

mi. ilictln'i

plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App, 1.9961.

n

Ilk

liiiiill u u i i l

nitiiiiiiitted

Generally speaking, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may not be brought to the
attention of the Court of Appeals on a direct appeal, usual "unusual... narrow circumstances exist."
State v. Vessey. 967 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah App. 1998)[citations omitted].

Such unusual

circumstances exist when "there is new counsel on appeal and there is an adequate trial record" for
the Court of Appeals to review the allegations. Id The present case fits the unusual narrow
circumstances exception which should permit this Court to review the ineffective assistance of
counsel issues on direct appeal.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant "must first show that
his trial counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." State v. Finlayson. 956 P.2d 283 (Utah App. 1998) citing to State v. Winward. 941
P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997)(quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668,687-688, 693,104
S. Ct. 2052, 2052, 2064,2067, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). "Once that is established, defendant must
show that "there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different absent the
deficient performance." IcL A "reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." IcL
Bhatia believes that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure
to object throughout the proceedings. First, Bhatia believes that counsel's performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness with respect to objecting to inadmissible matters throughout
the course of the trial. Counsel permitted testimony regarding events which were outside the scope
of the stipulation concerning admissible evidence. TT, P. 93, L 4-5. Counsel permitted the
prosecutor to make inflammatory comments in opening argument, during the trial and in closing
argument calculated to influence the juries mind concerning the nature of the evidence which they
would be presented. TT. P.91 L. 16-17; P. 97 L. 22 to P. 98 L. 1; TT. P. 102, L. 15-17; TT. P. 151
12

L. 12-15,17-20. Counsel permitted the prosecutor to continually characterize and refer to the videos
as "pornography " TT. P. 97 I ^: P 07 L. 22 to P.. 98 I 1; r
\":- ^.NtriiiM: 1
8 through. P. 1.1.4 I
pn >seci iti< m * itne >se

-,
4

"

...-_.

< .»»,i ^.. ;V.J .i..ttcd

,: *; 'ipulated admissibility dates. Yl . P. 110L.

Counsel permitted the prosecute \* -licit legal conclusions from
I I I 11.9.1 23 ,25; I ' 1 21 I 5 1 I 12.2 I

, ""i "i n i J I..,a i. 1 per n litted tl i,e

prosecutor to lead witnesses on direct examination resulting in direct identification of Bhatia, TT.
P 109 I 20-22 and. P 138 I 2,3 to P. 1.39 I 2 Finall) , Bliatia's counsel permittee ; . .

>r

to be argumentative concerning the right of Bhatia to an interpreter merely because the prosecutor
was frustrated with the pace of the questioning.

rrT B

Bhatia clearlj belie\ es that ti ial coi msel's c :)ii( >.: '

u s e d on the foregoing,
•' '

*v. an

'jective standard of

reasonableness.

Bhatia believes that he was prejudiced by the failure to object to evidence beyond the stipulation
date S ^ c s l . ^ - . i ; . une of the elements of the chargea crimen \\:::•• .i.ieni. •.»:. .\-.ng argum-ji.-. ....
prosecutor used the fact that videos had been confiscated from Bhatia on a date which was outside
the scope of the stipulation of admissibility to argue proof of intent. T T ™ ? 1 ? 1

1

"> 1 ^

rn

"«

were to determine. W h i l e eliciting testimony concerning the ultimate issue is perm.issi.ble
undci

*..w

••

... • ..*;. .vw.^. . i i *. kiciive, c|uc>uons w h i c h w o u l d m e r e l y allow a

witness t< i, i ell the ji in what resuh t< >i « ^ h ; \m i i< it nermitted " State \ Tenney. 913 P.2d 750
v^

Ji App. 1996)(stating that p _ ___

*ng such questions is "plain error" even if no objection

:

r Wa-vd - \.ll of the foregoing was prcjuuiciai to bnatia and constitutes plain error to the

1 3

degree that no objection was lodged. Moreover, the prejudice to Bhatia is sufficiently clear
that the failure to object throughout the proceedings and the impact thereon must undermine
the confidence this Court has in the outcome of the proceeding.
H.

BHATIA RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BASED
ON CUMULATIVE ERROR.
Bhatia received ineffective assistance of counsel based on cumulative error. The

standard of review is whether the trial court committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d
5 (Utah App. 1996). Because most of the allegations as set forth herein were not objected
to at trial, a plain error standard applies. Plain error has three elements which are (1) error;
(2) obviousness; and (3) prejudice. State v. Tenney. 913 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 1996).
Assuming arguendo, that while it is possible that any one single error as set forth herein and
throughout this brief by itself may not rise to the level error, Bhatia believes that the
cumulative effect of all of the errors is sufficient that together they must undermine this
Court's confidence in the verdict. See State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339 (Utah App. 1993) and
State v. Alonzo-Nolasco. 932 P.2d 606 (Utah App. 1997).
III.

BHATIA RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
BASED ON THE FAILURE OF COUNSEL TO REQUEST A PSYCHIATRIC
EVALUATION.
Bhatia received ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure of counsel to

request a psychiatric evaluation of Bhatia. The standard of review is whether the trial
court committed plain error. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). The evidence
before this Court was the Bhatia clearly did not understand the gravity of the proceeding

14

against him. First, in a pretrial hearing, Bhatia objected to a hearing being set on Thursday
based on his religious beliefs. TT. P. 2 3 1 , L. 12-23. On direct examination, Bhatia asked
what the difference was between the United State . .>:. :.;.. ;. . jiui ;:.-. , \< ;. .
Kl'iin nf" (lt»i)i

ir.pnp^r i

...J

i ijnostion concerning whether In; understood something

concerning what is required under those documents. I": 1 \ i"'' L 13-2! Based on nothing
more than Bhatia's failure to fully and complete!} understand the existence of separate
f (HHtiliitiotis ((in lln • Sl;ilt nl IH ill .iiiiJ 11 ii 1 Imled SluU: il v i lr II thai lieeuuld mil possibly
understand the implications of his rights and responsibilities thereunder. It is equally clear
that his counsel knew or should have known that Bhatia was not in his right mind and sought
a ps> chiatric e v aluation of Bhatia.
IV.

•

.•. .

• •

BHATIA R E C E I V E D I N E F F E C T I V E A SSI ST A > C E O F COUNSEI \* HEN
H I S A T T O R N E Y E N T E R E D I N T O s INSULATIONS \* I I HOU I HIS'
C O N S E N T W H I C H W E N T S P E C I F I C A L i V T O T H E E L E M E N T S O F THE
C R I M E S T H E STATE H A D ™ ^ R O V E .

stipulations without his client's consent which stipulations went specifically to the elements
the State had to prove for conviction. The standard of review is whether the trial court
-•

i:ucu puii:-

.Mate v.Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 ( Ufc til t \ j: >p 1/996).

Counsel entered into or made three separate stipulations which constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel because they fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. First,
counsel entered into said stipulations wiim
right t(

' '

msulting w ith his client An attorne) has no

inacts the si ibstantive rights of their r • *"
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-hout

the client's prior consent. Rackham v. Rackham. 230 P.2d 566 (Utah 1951). In each case,
the stipulations of counsel impacted the substantive rights of Bhatia without there being any
evidence that Bhatia consented to such stipulations.
First, counsel stipulated to the relevant period of admissibility. After having done so,
he failed to require the prosecutor to stand by his stipulation and limit the evidence as
stipulated. By failing to enforce the stipulation, the prosecutor used inadmissible evidence
to prove elements of the crime. Second, counsel stipulated to editing the tapes such that they
would not have to be shown in their entirety. However, the absence of any artistic,
literary, political or scientific value is specifically one of the elements of the crimes Bhatia
was charged with which the prosecution had the burden of proving. By stipulating to editing
the tapes, he precluded the jury from making the determination on that element. Finally, in
closing argument, Counsel specifically stipulated that the videos lacked any artistic, literary,
political or scientific value thereby completing eliminating the requirement that the State
prove that element of the charged offenses. Bhatia believes that entering such stipulations
clearly fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Bhatia further believes that he was prejudiced by such stipulations.

Initially,

stipulating to limiting the evidence to only evidence concerning the dates of the charged
events may have been sound trial strategy which would not be ineffective assistance of
counsel. However, there is no evidence that Bhatia consented to such a stipulation. More
importantly, once the stipulation was made, the failure to enforce the stipulation resulted in
prejudice to Bhatia insofar as the State used actions outside the relevant time frame to prove
16

the intent element of the crimes charged. This clearly was prejudicial. The other stipulations
were also prejudicial insofar as they eliminated the requirement that the state prove all of the
elements of its case beyond a reasonable doi ibt Bhatia!s com isel's stipulatioi is \ v ei e \ \ ithoi it
n »n ;iM)t imna,
prejudicial.
V(

istantive n J ? :t\ well below an objective reasonable standard and
• '

RECEIVED i N E F F E C T I V E ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BASED
ON THE MANNER WHICH COUNSEL PREPARED FOR TRIAL,

BHATIA

Bhatia received ineffective assistance of counsel in the manner in which counsel
prepared for trial. The standard of re\ iew is whether the trial court committed plain error.
State v. iruiii, l .. i . _...
"Tneff•• * -

;..:.. \; ;i

.sn)

;^i^n f .

!,

'institutionally tolerable simply

because counsel's conduct was intentional instead of merely negligent." State v. Bullock.
123 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah IVK)) Counsel has an ooligauon to reasonably prepare lor a
ei it's case, re j.!,ai

„ ii\K.a;i„ j \

Washixx^ioii. 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court stated when discussing an attorney^ ciufv to
investigate potential defenses based both on law and fact, "strategic choices made after less
lllidii luuipleli ifiiestigatitin

in iriMin.iMr piui \i\\ I

illiu i »U nl 111 mli U'.isiuiiilili'

professional JM'. laments support the limitations on investigations."
T-- the present case, Bhatia believes he received ineffective assistance of counsel in
themanne::

a...

.- ,-• . . •

>.

»•• ' ipecilk all\, uiijiiihit"! t din lit if1 ill

in the middle of the trial that a defense witness had entered the court room and that he had
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no idea what the witness would say. TT. P. 127 L. 23 to P. 128 L. 5. Clearly, counsel's own
admission during trial indicates a failure to adequately prepare for this proceeding. Bhatia
believes this falls below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Bhatia believes that counsel's failure to adequately prepare for trial prejudiced him.
Counsel did not interview all of the potential witnesses. He admitted as much. Based
thereon, Bhatia believes that counsel's lack of preparation contributed to the overall plethora
of mistakes which give rise to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
VI.

BHATIA RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BASED
ON COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MAKE AN OPENING ARGUMENT.
Bhatia received ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel to fail to make an

opening argument prior to the commencement of Bhatia's case. The standard of review is
whether the trial court committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App.
1996).
Bhatia's counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
First, he reserved the right to present his opening argument at the conclusion of the State
resting its case. TT, P. 106 L. 21 to P. 107 L. 11. Then, at the commencement of
Bhatia's case, he failed to give his opening argument. TT. P. 169. Bhatia does not
believe this was sound trial strategy. A similar event occurred in State v. Harry. 873 P.2d
1149 (Utah App. 1994). In that case, counsel claimed that it was an intentional subconscious
decision made for strategy purposes. Here, there is no such evidence. Rather, the evidence
is that counsel's conduct simply fell below an objective reasonable standard resulting in his
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forgetting to give his opening argument.
In the Harry case, the court concluded that the failure of counsel to give an
opening statement was not sufficiently prejudicial as to undermine its confidence in the
verdict. Bhatia believes his case is different. First, he believes that the jury was never
fully presented his story of the events such that they were put on notice of the defense
which Bhatia intended to present. Second, he does not believe that the cross examination
of the witnesses sufficiently informed the jury of his defense. Finally, he believes that
when coupled with all of the other incidents of conduct below an objective reasonable
standard, this is just one more example of the cumulative prejudice suffered by him
sufficient to collectively undermine this Court's confidence in the verdict.
VII.

IT WAS PLAIN ERROR TO PERMIT PROSECUTION WITNESSES TO
TESTIFY TO LEGAL CONCLUSIONS.
It was plain error to permit prosecution witnesses to testify as to legal conclusions.

The standard of review is whether the trial court committed plain error. State v. Irwin, 924
P.2d5(UtahApp. 1996).
Bhatia's counsel permitted the prosecutor to elicite legal conclusions from prosecution
witnesses. TT. P. 119 L. 23-25; P. 121 L. 5 to P. 122 L. 3. Specifically, both Newbold and Evans
testified that the videos were pornographic. TT. P. 119 L. 23-25; P. 121 L. 5 to P. 122 L. 3. While
eliciting testimony concerning the ulitimate issue is permissible under Rule 704 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, "questions which would merely allow a witness to tell the jury what
result to reach are not permitted.'1 State v. Tenney. 913 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 1996)(stating
that permitting such questions is "plain error" even if no objection is lodged).
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In the present case, no objections were lodged. Nonetheless, it was plain error to
permit the prosecutor to illicite legal conclusions from the prosecution witnesses. Bhatia was
prejudiced as a result of these errors. Specifically, these witnesses, police officers, told the
jury what they should conclude were the nature of the videos in question. Such testimony
is highly prejudicial and should not be elicited by the prosecutor. Bhatia believes that such
testimony regarding legal conclusions is sufficient to undermine the confidence in the verdict
rendered.
VIII. THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT,
The prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during the trial. Generally, no
objections were lodged as to the claimed conduct. As such, the standard of review is
whether the trial court committed plain error. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996).
Bhatia believes that the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct sufficient tow
arrant to an undermining of this Court's confidence in the verdict.

Specifically, the

prosecutor engaged in the following conduct:
A.

Testimony beyond Stipulation Dates.

The prosecutor elicitied testimony

regarding events which were outside the scope of the stipulation concerning admissible evidence.
TT, P. 93, L 4-5; TT. P. 110 L. 8 through P. 114 L. 4. In State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781 (Utah
1992), the Court defined the unique role of a prosecuting attorney as adversarial but with a
compelling obligation to the sovereignty with an obligation not necessarily to win cases, but rather
to insure that justice shall be done." To that end, when a prosecutor enters into a stipulation
limiting the admissibility of evidence to the dates of the particular crimes charged, he does not have
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the unbridled right to then elicite testimony beyond that stipulation date. Moreover, in the present
case, the prosecutor violated Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence by admitting evidence of
allegedly prior bad acts to prove the character of Bhatia in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith." IcL Specifically, in closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the fact that tapes had
been confiscated from Bhatia prior to the dates of the incidents charged proved his intent. Not only
was this evidence not admissible under Rule 404(b), but it was not evidence which should have been
before the Court at all based on the stipulation entered into by the prosecutor. Such conduct was
plain error.
B. Inflammatory Comments. The prosecutor continually made inflammatory
comments in opening argument, during the trial and in closing argument calculated to
influence the juries mind concerning the nature of the evidence which they would be
presented. TT. P.91 L. 16-17; P. 97 L. 22 to P. 98 L. 1; TT. P. 102, L. 15-17; TT. P. 151 L.
12-15,17-20. The prosecutor told the jury that the evidence would make them sick. He told
them they had the unfortunate duty of viewing the videos. In opening arguments, the
prosecutor has the right to tell the jury what he expects the evidence will be, but not to be
argumentative in so doing.

The continual making of inflammatory statements was

prejudicial and misconduct.
C. Characterization of the Videos, The prosecutor continually characterized and
referred to the videos as "pornography." TT. P. 97 L. 3; P. 97 L. 22 to P. 98 L. 1; P. 173 L.
20-22.

By so doing, he implied to the jury the ultimate conclusion he wanted them to

reach. Finally, counsel for Bhatia objected and the objection was sustained. However, at
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that point the trial was nearly concluded and the prosecutor has been implying to the jury all
day long that the videos were pornography which was for them to decide. Such improper
statements are prosecutorial misconduct.
D. Legal Conclusions. The prosecutor elicited legal conclusions from prosecution
witnesses. TT. P. 119 L. 23-25; P. 121 L. 5 to P. 122 L. 3. Specifically, the prosecutor had
both police officers testify as to their legal conclusion that the videos were pornographic.
As noted above, it is impermissible to elicite such legal conclusions and is contrary to the
duty of a prosecutor to insure that the administration ofjustice is done. This is but one more
cumulative showing of prejudice which should undermine this Court's confidence in the
verdict.
E.

Leading Witnesses on Direct. The prosecutor lead witnesses on direct

examination resulting in direct identification of Bhatia. TT. P. 109 L. 20-22 and P. 138 L.
23 to P. 139 L. 2. Admittedly the trial court has wide discretion to permit leading questions
and the administration of the case. However, ,fit is essential that judges exercise tight control
over the use of leading questions . . . to assure that they are used onl after more open ended
questions have failed to produce responses." State v. Kallin. 877 P.2d 138 (Utah 1994). In
the present case, the prosecutor was permitted to lead his witnesses into identifying Bhatia
as the individual who allegedly sold them they videos and was responsible for the crimes
charged. Such leading was impermissible and prejudicial error.
F.

Argumentative. The prosecutor was argumentative with Bhatia concerning

the right of Bhatia to an interpreter merely because the prosecutor was frustrated with the
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pace of the questioning. TT. P. 174 L. 11-22. Specifically, in the presence of the jury the
prosecutor told the Court and the members of the jury that the use of an interpretor was a
"sham." Such comments evidenced not only the prosecutors frustration but called into
question the overall credibility of Bhatia to the jury through impermissible argument and
castigation. Such conduct is prosecutorial misconduct.
The collective acts of the prosecutor were misconduct which prejudiced Bhatia. Such
conduct, taken as a whole, should undermine this Court's confidence in the verdict.
IX.

THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DENYING BHATIA'S
MOTION BASED ON SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE.

The Court erred as a matter of law by denying the motion filed by Bhatia based on
a single criminal episode. The standard of review is that the legal conclusions of the Court
are reviewed for correctness without any deference thereto. State v. Brooks. 908 d 856, 859
(Utah 1995).
In the present case, Bhatia filed a motion claiming that the single criminal episode
precluded the state from charging him with three separate counts as they were all part of the
same criminal episode. TT. P. 167 L. 23 to P. 168 L. 8. Essentially, the State argued that
because Bhatia allegedly sold three separate tapes, each sale was a separate chargeable
offense under §76-1-1204, Utah Code Annotated. The Court denied the motion, agreeing
with the State.
A single criminal episode means "all conduct which is closely related in time and is
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incident to an attempt or accomplishment of a single criminal episode." §76-1-401, Utah
Code Annotated (1953 as amended). Essentially, when the same act of a defendant is
punishable in two separate ways, pursuant to the single criminal episode statute, the
Defendant may be charged with only one count. §78-1-402, Utah Code Annotated (1953
as amended).
Bhatia believes that the single criminal episode statute applied to the charges brought
against him. In interpreting this statute, the courts have applied the statute when the events
are closely related in time and to accomplish the same criminal objective. State v. Cornish.
571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977). In the present case, the evidence was that Bhatia allegedly sold
three pornographic videos to Office Evans, one on April 19, 1998 and two on April 24,
1998.
Assuming arguendo that Bhatia did in fact sell the videos to the Office, the objective
of such an act was to distribute videos which may have been unlawful. As such, the
objective to be accomplished on April 19,1998 and April 24,1998 was the same objective
both days. Additionally, Bhatia believes that they are sufficiently close in time to be
considered as falling under the single criminal episode statute. However, again assuming
arguendo, that this Court finds that the nexus of time between April 19 and April 24, 1998
are not sufficiently close, nonetheless the single criminal episode statute would preclude
conviction on two counts based on the single sale of two videos on the same day, at the same
time, to the same person.
Based on the foregoing, the Court erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of the
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single criminal episode statute. This Court should overturn Bhatia's convictions based
thereon.
CONCLUSION
Bhatia received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to object
during the trial. There was no legitimate trial strategy which supported this failure to object.
Bhatia receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on cumulative error. Bhatia believes
that he was prejudiced in each instance by ineffective counsel but even if he was not
prejudiced by each individual incident of ineffective assistance of counsel the cumulative
effect of such conduct deprived him of a fair trial. Bhatia received ineffective assistance
of counsel for the failure of counsel to request a psychiatric evaluation of Bhatia. The
evidence was clear that Bhatia was irrational to the point of requesting the Court not set
hearings on Thursdays for allegedly religious reasons. Bhatia received ineffective assistance
of counsel when counsel entered into stipulations without his client's consent which
stipulations went specifically to the elements the State had to prove for conviction. Bhatia
was clearly prejudiced by such a stipulation entered into without his consent. Bhatia
received ineffective assistance of counsel in the manner in which counsel prepared for
trial. Counsel even went so far as to acknowledge to the Court that a witness came into the
Court room the subject of his testimony was unknown to counsel. Bhatia received
ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel to fail to make an opening argument prior to the
commencement of Bhatia's case. Counsel's failure prejudiced Bhatia by not alerting the jury
to his defense prior to its presentation.
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Bhatia believes that plain error was committed when the Court permitted witnesses
to testify of legal conclusions which were the ultimate issue to be determined by the trier of
fact. Bhatia believes the prosecutor continually made improper prejudicial comments
throughout the trial. Bhatia believes that it was error to permit the prosecutor to lead
witnesses thereby suggesting the answer to identifications of Bhatia. Bhatia believes the
Court err as a matter of law by denying the motion filed by Bhatia based on a single criminal
episode.
Dated and Signed this J?_ day of April, 2000.

^JeffreyC. Howe
FAMILY LAW PRACTICE
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
Determinative Law of the Appeal
(1) United States Constitution Amendment VI;
(2) Utah State Constitution Article I, Section 10 and 12;
(3) Strickland v. Washington
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1
AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.

© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing™ companies. Allrightsreserved.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
Statute text
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided
by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as
defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine
probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.

1
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall
consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of no fewer than
eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but
in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases the verdict shall be
unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall
be waived unless demanded.

© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing™ companies. All rights reserved.
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STRICKLAND, SUPERINTENDENT, FLORIDA STATE
PRISON, ET AL. v. WASHINGTON
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THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 82-1554.

Argued January 10, 1984—Decided May 14, 1984

Respondent pleaded guilty in a Florida trial court to an indictment that
included three capital murder charges. In the plea colloquy, respondent
told the trial judge that, although he had committed a string of burglaries, he had no significant prior criminal record and that at the time of his
criminal spree he was under extreme stress caused by his inability to
support his family. The trial judge told respondent that he had u a great
deal of respect for people who are willing to step forward and admit their
responsibility." In preparing for the sentencing hearing, defense counsel spoke with respondent about his background, but did not seek out
character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination. Counsel's
decision not to present evidence concerning respondent's character and
emotional state reflected his judgment that it was advisable to rely on
the plea colloquy for evidence as to such matters, thus preventing the
State from cross-examining respondent and from presenting psychiatric
evidence of its own. Counsel did not request a presentence report because it would have included respondent's criminal history and thereby
would have undermined the claim of no significant prior criminal record.
Finding numerous aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, the trial judge sentenced respondent to death on each of the murder counts. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, and respondent then
sought collateral relief in state court on the ground, inter alia, that counsel had rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing proceeding in
several respects, including his failure to request a psychiatric report, to
investigate and present character witnesses, and to seek a presentence
report. The trial court denied relief, and the Florida Supreme Court
affirmed. Respondent then filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal
District Court advancing numerous grounds for relief, including the
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing,
the District Court denied relief, concluding that although counsel made
errors in judgment in failing to investigate mitigating evidence further
than he did, no prejudice to respondent's sentence resulted from any
such error in judgment. The Court of Appeals ultimately reversed,
stating that the Sixth Amendment accorded criminal defendants a right
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to counsel rendering "reasonably effective assistance given the totality of
the circumstances." After outlining standards for judging whether a
defense counsel fulfilled the duty to investigate nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances and whether counsel's errors were sufficiently prejudicial
to justify reversal, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for application of the standards.
Held:
1. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to the effective
assistance of counsel, and the benchmark forjudging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result. The same principle applies to a capital
sentencing proceeding—such as the one provided by Florida law—that is
sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of
standards for decision that counsel's role in the proceeding is comparable
to counsel's role at trial. Pp. 684-687.
2. A convicted defendant's chum that counsel's assistance \va> ><> defective as to require reversal of a conviction or setting aside of a death
sentence requires that the defendant show, first, that counsel's performance was deficient and, second, that the deficient performance prejudice!
the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair truu. Pp. »v»7-6i»i.
(a) The proper standard for judging attorney performance is tr.at
of reasonably effective assistance, considering all the circumstance
When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness ofcnun>«-."assistance, the defendant must >ho\v that counsel's representation .v.!
below an objective standard of reasonableness,. Judical -cn;:in\ f
counsel's performance must be highly deferential. and a fair assessrr.f.t
of attorney performance requires that every effort he made to r.imir..^the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstance- :
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from CUIIM . perspective at the time. A court must indulge a strong presump:. -.
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable prof,—
sional assistance. These standards require no special amplification r.
order to define counsel's duty to investigate, the duty at :ssue :n :r..s
case. Pp. 687-691.
(b) With regard to the required showing of prejudice, the pmr-r
standard requires the defendant to show that there :s a reasonac.e yr> rabiiity that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the resu.: of :r.e
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probao:.::y ..- .i
probability sufficient :o undermine confidence :n the outcome. A *• -r.
hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totauity ..f tr.t- •••.--dence before the judge or jury. Pp. 691-6W.
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3. A number of practical considerations are important for the application of the standards set forth above. The standards do not establish
mechanical rules; the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. A
court need not first determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a
result of the alleged deficiencies. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that
course should be followed. The principles governing ineffectiveness
claims apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do on direct appeal
or in motions lor a new trial. And m a federal habeas challenge to a
state criminal judgment, a state court conclusion that counsel rendered
effective assistance is not a finding of fact binding on the federal court to
the extent stated by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), but is a mixed question of law
and fact. Pp. 696-698.
4. The facts of this case make it clear that counsel's conduct at and
before respondent's sentencing proceeding cannot be found unreasonable
under the above standards. They also make it clear that, even assuming counsel's conduct was unreasonable, respondent suffered insufficient
prejudice to warrant setting aside his death sentence. Pp. 698-700.
693 F. 2d 1243, reversed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ.,

joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part, post, p. 701. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post,
p. 706.

Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Assistant Attorney General of
Florida, argued the cause for petitioners. On the briefs
were Jim Smith, Attorney General, and Calvin L. Fox,
Assistant Attorney General.
Richard E. Shapiro argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief was Joseph H. Rodriguez.*
*Briefs of amid curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States
by Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Trott, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, and Edwin S. Kneedler; for the State of Alabama et al.
by Mike Greely, Attorney General of Montana, and John H. Maynard,
Assistant Attorney General, Charles A. Graddick, Attorney General of
Alabama, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, John Steven
Clark, Attorney General of Arkansas, John Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Duane Woodard, Attorney General of Colorado, Austin
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delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to consider the proper standards for
judging a criminal defendant's contention that the Constitution requires a conviction or death sentence to be set aside
because counsel's assistance at the trial or sentencing was
ineffective.
I
A
JUSTICE O'CONNOR

During a 10-day period in September 197G, respondent
planned and committed three groups of crimes, which inJ. McGuigan, Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut, Mictuul J Boner*.
Attorney General of Georgia, Tan if S. Hong, Attorney General of" Hawaii.
Jim Jones, Attorney General of Idaho, Linlci/ E Ptarvw. Attorne\ Gen
eral of Indiana. Robert T Stephan. Attorney General of Kan>a>. >fei« n I.
Beshear, Attorney General of Kentucky. Will nun J Gu.stt, Jr . Attorne\
General of Louisiana. James E Ticrnvif, Attorney General of Maine
Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland. Francis \ B< >!<>''
Attorney General of Mas.sachui>ett>. Frank J A*«//«»/. Attorne} Genera,
of Michigan, Hubert H Humphrey III. Attorney General "f Minnesota
William A. Allam. Attorney General o( Mi>M>Mppi. /«>/<» U A^'c-'.f
Attorney General of Missouri. Paul L Domva^ A t t o n e \ General ;
Nebraska. Brian McKay, Attorne) General ot Ne\aaa. In »» / K '> >> ,
man. Attorney General of Ness Jer>e\. Paul Ha ram \t . \:'<>rw < ie* <••• i
of New Mexico, Rutas L. Edmisten. Attorne) General «»i N.-nn > ar«' .' a
Robert Wetald. Attorney General of North Dakota. Anti,,,v t <'• ,'"•::
Jr . Attorney Genera] of Ohio, Mictun I T trpt n. A t t u n e ) < « -.t ru f « K .i
horna. Dave Frohnmai/er, Attorney General oi < iregon. L* R / s / /»>•» > man. Attorney General of Pennsylvania. Denv s / Rofn^s // \;:nr,«
General of Rhode Island. T Trans Mtalock. Attome> Genera. >f .N. u :r
Carolina. Mark V. Meierhenn/, Attorne) General «>f S„u:r. I W . ' a W
liam M Leech. Jr., Attorney General of Tenne--.ee [)a aL W ^
Attorney General of Utah./O/JN ,/ Easum, Attorn- 1 Genera. :" V, rrn* •
Gerald L. Babies. Attorney General of Virginia. A\ »»>'• '/> ' > E •.»''• ^ ,
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eluded three brutal stabbing murders, torture, kidnaping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and
theft. After his two accomplices were arrested, respondent
surrendered to police and voluntarily gave a lengthy statement confessing to the third of the criminal episodes. The
State of Florida indicted respondent for kidnaping and murder and appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him.
Counsel actively pursued pretrial motions and discovery.
He cut his efforts short, however, and he experienced a sense
of hopelessness about the case, when he learned that, against
his specific advice, respondent had also confessed to the first
two murders. By the date set for trial, respondent was subject to indictment for three counts of first-degree murder and
multiple counts of robbery, kidnaping for ransom, breaking
and entering and assault, attempted murder, and conspiracy
to commit robbery. Respondent waived his right to a jury
trial, again acting against counsel's advice, and pleaded guilty
to all charges, including the three capital murder charges.
In the plea colloquy, respondent told the trial judge that,
although he had committed a string of burglaries, he had no
significant prior criminal record and that at the time of his
criminal spree he was under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family. App. 50-53. He also stated,
however, that he accepted responsibility for the crimes.
E. g., id., at 54, 57. The trial judge told respondent that
he had "a great deal of respect for people who are willing
to step forward and admit their responsibility" but that he
was making no statement at all about his likely sentencing
decision. Id., at 62.
Counsel advised respondent to invoke his right under Florida law to an advisory jury at his capital sentencing hearing.
Respondent rejected the advice and waived the right. . He
chose instead to be sentenced by the trial judge without a
jury recommendation.
In preparing for the sentencing hearing, counsel spoke
with respondent about his background. He also spoke on
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the telephone with respondent's wife and mother, though he
did not follow up on the one unsuccessful effort to meet with
them. He did not otherwise seek out character witnesses
for respondent. App. to Pet. for Cert. A265. Nor did he
request a psychiatric examination, since his conversations
with his client gave no indication that respondent had psychological problems. Id., at A266.
Counsel decided not to present and hence not to look further for evidence concerning respondent's character and emotional state. That decision reflected trial counsel's sense of
hopelessness about overcoming the evidentiary effect of respondent's confessions to the gruesome crimes. See id., at
A282. It also reflected the judgment that it was advisable
to rely on the plea colloquy for evidence about respondent's
background and about his claim of emotional stress: the plea
colloquy communicated sufficient information about these subjects, and by forgoing the opportunity to present new evidence on these subjects, counsel prevented the State from
cross-examining respondent on his claim and from putting on
psychiatric evidence of its own. Id., at A223-A225.
Counsel also excluded from the sentencing hearing other
evidence he thought was potentially damaging. He successfully moved to exclude respondent's "rap sheet." Id , at
A227; App. 311. Because he judged that a presentence report might prove more detrimental than helpful, as it would
have included respondent's criminal history and thereby
would have undermined the claim of no significant history of
criminal activity, he did not request that one be prepared.
App. to Pet. for Cert. A227-A228, A265-A266.
At the sentencing hearing, counsel's strategy was based
primarily on the trial judge's remarks at the plea colloquy as
well as on his reputation as a sentencing judge who thought it
important for a convicted defendant to own up to his crime.
Counsel argued that respondent's remorse and acceptance of
responsibility justified sparing him from the death penalty.
Id., at A265-A266. Counsel also argued that respondent
had no history of criminal activity and that respondent com-
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mitted the crimes under extreme mental or emotional disturbance, thus coming within the statutory list of mitigating
circumstances. He further argued that respondent should
be spared death because he had surrendered, confessed, and
offered to testify against a codefendant and because respondent was fundamentally a good person who had briefly gone
badly wrong in extremely stressful circumstances. The
State put on evidence and witnesses largely for the purpose
of describing the details of the crimes. Counsel did not
cross-examine the medical experts who testified about the
manner of death r respondent's victims.
The trial judge found several aggravating circumstances
with respect to each of the three murders. He found that all
three murders were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel,
all involving repeated stabbings. All three murders were
committed in the course of at least one other dangerous and
violent felony, and since all involved robbery, the murders
were for pecuniary gain. All three murders were committed
to avoid arrest for the accompanying crimes and to hinder
law enforcement. In the course of one of the murders,
respondent knowingly subjected numerous persons to a
grave risk of death by deliberately stabbing and shooting
the murder victim's sisters-in-law, who sustained severe—in
one case, ultimately fatal—injuries.
With respect to mitigating circumstances, the trial judge
made the same findings for all three capital murders. First,
although there was no admitted evidence of prior convictions,
respondent had stated that he had engaged in a course of
stealing. In any case, even if respondent had no significant
history of criminal activity, the aggravating circumstances
"would still clearly far outweigh" that mitigating factor.
Second, the judge found that, during all three crimes, respondent was not suffering from extreme mental or emotional disturbance and could appreciate the criminality of
his acts.
Third, none of the victims was a participant in,
or consented to, respondent's conduct. Fourth, respondent's
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participation in the crimes was neither minor nor the result of
duress or domination by an accomplice. Finally, respondent's age (26) could not be considered a factor in mitigation,
especially when viewed in light of respondent's planning of
the crimes and disposition of the proceeds of the various
accompanying thefts.
In short, the trial judge found numerous aggravating circumstances and no (or a single comparatively insignificant)
mitigating circumstance. With respect to each of the three
convictions for capital murder, the trial judge concluded: "A
careful consideration of all matters presented to the court impels the conclusion that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances . . . to outweigh the aggravating circumstances."
See Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d HoS, t->t>:>—<><S-4 (Fla. 19TS)
(quoting trial court findings), cert, denied, 441 l \ S. i»37
(1979). He therefore sentenced respondent to death on
each of the three counts of murder and to prison terms for
the other crimes. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the
convictions and sentences on direct appeal.
B

Respondent subsequently sought collateral relief .n - i ^ e
court on numerous grounds, amomr them that counsel r.,id
rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing: pmceedn j
Respondent challenged counsel'- assistance in M\ re-pecHe asserted that counsel was ineffective because he failed <
'>
move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing, to requ<—*
a psychiatric report, to investigate and present character
witnesses, to seek a presentence investigation report. :o vv •sent meaningful arguments to the <entencmtr judire. and * .
investigate the medical examiner's reports- or eross-e\am::v
the medical experts. In support of the claim, resn«»nde'::
submitted 14 affidavits from friends, neighbors, and re.atr. —
stating that they would have testified if asked to <io -.•. Halso submitted one psychiatric report and <»ne ps\ ch«''.nir.« ,i.
report stating that respondent, thouirh not under :r.e :r.:i .-
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ence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, was
"chronically frustrated and depressed because of his economic dilemma" at the time of his crimes. App. 7; see also
id., at 14.
The trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, finding that the record evidence conclusively showed
that the ineffectiveness claim was meritless. App. to Pet.
for Cert. A206-A243. Four of the assertedly prejudicial
errors required little discussion. First, there were no
grounds to request a continuance, so there was no error in
not requesting one when respondent pleaded guilty. Id., at
A218-A220. Second, failure to request a presentence investigation was not a serious error because the trial judge had
discretion not to grant such a request and because any
presentence investigation would have resulted in admission
of respondent's "rap sheet" and thus would have undermined
his assertion of no significant history of criminal activity.
Id., at A226-A228. Third, the argument and memorandum
given to the sentencing judge were "admirable" in light of
the overwhelming aggravating circumstances and absence of
mitigating circumstances. Id., at A228. Fourth, there was
no error in failure to examine the medical examiner's reports
or to cross-examine the medical witnesses testifying on the
manner of death of respondent's victims, since respondent
admitted that the victims died in the ways shown by the
unchallenged medical evidence. Id., at A229.
The trial court dealt at greater length with the two other
bases for the ineffectiveness claim. The court pointed out
that a psychiatric examination of respondent was conducted
by state order soon after respondent's initial arraignment.
That report states that there was no indication of major mental illness at the time of the crimes. Moreover, both the
reports submitted in the collateral proceeding state that, although respondent was "chronically frustrated and depressed
because of his economic dilemma," he was not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. All three
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reports thus directly undermine the contention made at the
sentencing hearing that respondent was suffering from extreme mental or emotional disturbance during his crime
spree. Accordingly, counsel could reasonably decide not to
seek psychiatric reports; indeed, by relying solely on the plea
colloquy to support the emotional disturbance contention,
counsel denied the State an opportunity to rebut his claim
with psychiatric testimony. In any event, the aggravating
circumstances were so overwhelming that no substantial
prejudice resulted from the absence at sentencing of the
psychiatric evidence offered in the collateral attack.
The court rejected the challenge to counsel's failure to develop and to present character evidence for much the same
reasons. The affidavits submitted in the collateral proceeding showed nothing more than that certain persons would
have testified that respondent was basically a good person
who was worried about his family's financial problems. Respondent himself had already testified along those lines at the
plea colloquy. Moreover, respondent's admission of a course
of stealing rebutted many of the factual allegations in the affidavits. For those reasons, and because the sentencing judire
had stated that the death sentence would be appropriate
even if respondent had no significant prior criminal history.
no substantial prejudice resulted from the absence at sentencing of the character evidence offered in the coilatera.
attack.
Applying the standard for ineffectiveness claims articulated by the Florida Supreme Court in Knight v. State. oiM
So. 2d 997 (1981), the trial court concluded that respondent
had not shown that counsel's assistance reflected any substantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of competent counsel that was likely to have affected the outcome
of the sentencing proceeding. The court specifically found:
"[A]s a matter of law, the record affirmatively demonstrates
beyond any doubt that even if [counsel] had done eacr. «»f the
. . . things [that respondent alleged counsel had railed to :<•
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at the time of sentencing, there is not even the remotest
chance that the outcome would have been any different.
The plain fact is that the aggravating circumstances proved
in this case were completely overwhelming . . . ." App. to
Pet. for Cert. A230.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief.
Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285 (1981). For essentially
the reasons given by the trial court, the State Supreme Court
concluded that respondent had failed to make out a prima
facie case of either "substantial deficiency or possible prejudice" and, indeed, had "failed to such a degree that we
believe, to the point of a moral certainty, that he is entitled
to no relief . . . ." Id.y at 287. Respondent's claims were
"shown conclusively to be without merit so as to obviate the
need for an evidentiary hearing." Id., at 286.
C
Respondent next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida. He advanced numerous grounds for relief,
among them ineffective assistance of counsel ba^ed on the
same errors, except for the failure to move for a continuance,
as those he had identified in state court. The District Court
held an evidentiary hearing to inquire into trial counsel's efforts to investigate and to present mitigating circumstances.
Respondent offered the affidavits and reports he had submitted in the state collateral proceedings; he also called his trial
counsel to testify. The State of Florida, over respondent's
objection, called the trial judge to testify.
The District Court disputed none of the state court factual
findings concerning trial counsel's assistance and made findings of its own that are consistent with the state court findings. The account of trial counsel's actions and decisions
given above reflects the combined findings. On the legal
issue of ineffectiveness, the District Court concluded that,
although trial counsel made errors in judgment in failing to
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investigate nonstatutory mitigating evidence further than he
did, no prejudice to respondent's sentence resulted from any
such error in judgment. Relying in part on the trial judge's
testimony but also on the same factors that led the state
courts to find no prejudice, the District Court concluded that
"there does not appear to be a likelihood, or even a significant
possibility," that any errors of trial counsel had affected the
outcome of the sentencing proceeding. App. to Pet. for
Cert. A286-A286. The District Court went on to reject all
of respondent's other grounds for relief, including one not exhausted in state court, which the District Court considered
because, among other reasons, the State urged its consideration. Id., at A286-A292. The court accordingly denied
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded with instructions to apply to the particular fact>
the framework for analyzing ineffectiveness claims that it
developed in its opinion. b'To F. 2d >>~\) (19X2). The panel
decision was itself vacated when Unit B of the former Fifth
Circuit, now the Eleventh Circuit, decided to rehear the
case en banc. 679 F. 2d 23 <19S2). The full Court of Appeals developed its own framework for analyzing meffeewe
assistance claims and reversed the judgment uf the Di.-'riet
Court and remanded the case for new factfinding under 'he
newly announced standards. b'98 F. 2d 124:] 119.v2 .
The court noted at the outset that, because respor.den: r.ad
raised an unexhausted claim at his evidentiary hearing u: *ne
District Court, the habeas petition might be characterize-: a>
a mixed petition subject to the rule of Rose v. L nxhi. 4-V)
U. S. 509 (1982), requiring dismissal of the entire pet::. »n.
The court held, however, that the exhaustion requirement :>
"a matter of comity rather than a matter of jurisdiction" -JM
hence admitted of exceptions. The court airreed with *ne
District Court that this ca<e came within an exception : • :r.e
mixed petition rule. 698 F. 2d, at 124<*\ n. 7.
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Turning to the merits, the Court of Appeals stated that the
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel accorded
criminal defendants a right to "counsel reasonably likely to
render and rendering reasonably effective assistance given
the totality of the circumstances." Id., at 1250. The court
remarked in passing that no special standard applies in capital cases such as the one before it: the punishment that a
defendant faces is merely one of the circumstances to be
considered in determining whether counsel was reasonably
effective. Id., at 1250, n. 12. The court then addressed
respondent's contention that his trial counsel's assistance
was not reasonably effective because counsel breached his
duty to investigate nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.
The court agreed that the Sixth Amendment imposes on
counsel a duty to investigate, because reasonably effective
assistance must be based on professional decisions and informed legal choices can be made only after investigation
of options. The court observed that counsel's investigatory
decisions must be assessed in light of the information known
at the time of the decisions, not in hindsight, and that "[tjhe
amount of pretrial investigation that is reasonable defies
precise measurement." Id., at 1251. Nevertheless, putting
guilty-plea cases to one side, the court attempted to classify
cases presenting issues concerning the scope of the duty to
investigate before proceeding to trial.
If there is only one plausible line of defense, the court
concluded, counsel must conduct a "reasonably substantial
investigation" into that line of defense, since there can be
no strategic choice that renders such an investigation unnecessary. Id., at 1252. The same duty exists if counsel
relies at trial on only one line of defense, although others
are available. In either case, the investigation need not be
exhaustive. It must include "'an independent examination
of the facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws involved.'"
Id., at 1253 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 590 F. 2d 103, 104
(CA5 1979)). The scope of the duty, however, depends
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on such facts as the strength of the government's case and
the likelihood that pursuing certain leads may prove more
harmful than helpful. 693 F. 2d, at 1253, n. 16.
If there is more than one plausible line of defense, the court
held, counsel should ideally investigate each line substantially before making a strategic choice about which lines to
rely on at trial. If counsel conducts such substantial investigations, the strategic choices made as a result "will seldom
if ever" be found wanting. Because advocacy is an art and
not a science, and because the adversary system requires
deference to counsel's informed decisions, strategic choices
must be respected in these circumstances if they are based
on professional judgment. Id., at 1254.
If counsel does not conduct a substantial investigation into
each of several plausible lines of defense, assistance may
nonetheless be effective. Counsel may not exclude certain
lines of defense for other than strategic reasons. /(/.. at
1257-1258. Limitations of time and money, however, may
force early strategic choices, often based solely on conversations with the defendant and a review of the prosecution'.evidence. Those strategic choices about which lines of defense to pursue are owed deference commensurate with the
reasonableness of the professional judgments on which they
are based. Thus, "when counsel's assumptions are reasonable
given the totality of the circumstances and when eoun>elV
strategy represents a reasonable choice based upon those assumptions, counsel need not investigate lines of defense :hat
he has chosen not to employ at trial." Id., at 1255 «footnote
omitted). Among the factors relevant to deciding whether
particular strategic choices are reasonable are the experience
of the attorney, the inconsistency of unpursued and pursued
lines of defense, and the potential for prejudice from taking
an unpursued line of defense. Id., at 1256-1257, n. 23.
Having outlined the standards forjudging whether defense
counsel fulfilled the duty to investigate, the Court of Appeals
turned its attention to the question of the prejudice to the
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defense that must be shown before counsel's errors justify
reversal of the judgment. The court observed that only in
cases of outright denial of counsel, of affirmative government
interference in the representation process, or of inherently
prejudicial conflicts of interest had this Court said that no
special showing of prejudice need be made. Id., at 12581259. For cases of deficient performance by counsel, where
the government is not directly responsible for the deficiencies
and where evidence of deficiency may be more accessible to
the defendant than to the prosecution, the defendant must
show that counsel's errors "resulted in actual and substantial
disadvantage to the course of his defense." Id., at 1262.
This standard, the Court of Appeals reasoned, is compatible
with the "cause and prejudice" standard for overcoming
procedural defaults in federal collateral proceedings and
discourages insubstantial claims by requiring more than a
showing, which could virtually always be made, of some conceivable adverse effect on the defense from counsel's errors.
The specified showing of prejudice would result in reversal of
the judgment, the court concluded, unless the prosecution
showed that the constitutionally deficient performance was,
in light of all the evidence, harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id., at 1260-1262.
The Court of Appeals thus laid down the tests to be applied
in the Eleventh Circuit in challenges to convictions on the
ground of ineffectiveness of counsel. Although some of the
judges of the court proposed different approaches to judging
ineffectiveness claims either generally or when raised in federal habeas petitions from state prisoners, id., at 1264-1280
(opinion of Tjoflat, J.); id., at 1280 (opinion of Clark, J.); id.,
at 1285-1288 (opinion of Roney, J., joined by Fay and Hill,
JJ.); id., at 1288-1291 (opinion of Hill, J.), and although some
believed that no remand was necessary in this case, id., at
1281-1285 (opinion of Johnson, J., joined by Anderson, J.);
id., at 1285-1288 (opinion of Roney, J., joined by Fay and
Hill, JJ.); id., at 1288-1291 (opinion of Hill, J.), a majority
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of the judges of the en banc court agreed that the case should
be remanded for application of the newly announced standards. Summarily rejecting respondent's claims other than
ineffectiveness of counsel, the court accordingly reversed the
judgment of the District Court and remanded the case. On
remand, the court finally ruled, the state trial judge's testimony, though admissible "to the extent that it contains personal knowledge of historical facts or expert opinion," was
not to be considered admitted into evidence to explain the
judge's mental processes in reaching his sentencing decision.
Id., at 1262-1263; see Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U. S. 276,
306-307 (1904).
D
Petitioners, who are officials of the State of Florida, filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the decision
of the Court of Appeals. The petition presents a type of
SLxth Amendment claim that this Court has not previously
considered in any generality. The Court has considered
Sixth Amendment claims based on actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether, as well as claims
based on state interference with the ability of counsel to render effective assistance to the accused. E. g., United States
v. Cronic, ante, p, 648. With the exception of Cuyler v.
S Iwan, 446 U. S. 335 (1980), however, which involved a
claim that counsel's assistance was rendered ineffective by
a conflict of interest, the Court has never directly and fully
addressed a claim of "actual ineffectiveness" of counsel's
assistance in a case going to trial. Cf. United States v.
Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 102, n. 5 (1976).
In assessing attorney performance, all the Federal Courts of
Appeals and all but a few state courts have now adopted the
"reasonably effective assistance" standard in one formulation
or another. See Trapnell v. United States, 725 F. 2d 149,
151-152 (C A21983); App. B to Brief for United States in United
States v. Cronic, O. T. 1983, No. 82-660, pp. 3a-6a; Sarno,
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Modern Status of Rules and Standards in State Courts as to
Adequacy of Defense Counsel's Representation of Criminal
Client, 2 A. L. R. 4th 99-157, §§ 7-10 (1980). Yet this Court
has not had occasion squarely to decide whether that is the
proper standard. With respect to the prejudice that a defendant must show from deficient attorney performance, the
lower courts have adopted tests that purport to differ in more
than formulation. See App. C to Brief for United States in
United States v. Cronic, supra, at 7a-10a; Sarno, supra, at
83-99, § 6. In particular, the Court of Appeals in this case
expressly rejected the prejudice standard articulated by
Judge Leventhal in his plurality opinion in United States v.
Decoster, 199 U. S. App. D. C. 359, 371, 374-375, 624 F. 2d
196, 208, 211-212 (en banc), cert, denied, 444 U. S. 944
(1979), and adopted by the State of Florida in Knight v.
State, 394 So. 2d, at 1001, a standard that requires a showing that specified deficient conduct of counsel was likely
to have affected the outcome of the proceeding. 693 F. 2d,
at 1261-1262.
For these reasons, we granted certiorari to consider the
standards by which to judge a contention that the Constitution requires that a criminal judgment be overturned because
of the actual ineffective assistance of counsel. 462 U. S.
1105 (1983). We agree with the Court of Appeals that
the exhaustion rule requiring dismissal of mixed petitions,
though to be strictly enforced, is not jurisdictional. See
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S., at 515-520. We therefore address the merits of the constitutional issue.
II
In a long line of cases that includes Powell v. Alabama, 287
U. S. 45 (1932), Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938), and
Gideon v. Waintvright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), this Court has
recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists,
and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a
fair trial. The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through
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the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of
a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
Thus, a fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding. The
right to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system
embodied in the SLxth Amendment, since access to counsel's
skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the
"ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution" to
which they are entitled. Adams v. United States ex re!
McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 275, 276 (1942); see Powell v. Alabama, supra, at 68-69.
Because of the vital importance of counsel's assistance, thiCourt has held that, with certain exceptions, a person accused of a federal or state crime has the right to have counsel
appointed if retained counsel cannot be obtained. See
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wawwright, supra; Johnson v. Zerbst, supra. That a person
who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the
accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional
command. The SLxth Amendment recognizes the right to
the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be
assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who
plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.
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For that reason, the Court has recognized that "the right
to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771, n. 14 (1970).
Government violates the right to effective assistance when it
interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make
independent decisions about how to conduct the defense.
See, e. g., Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80 (1976) (bar
on attorney-client consultation during overnight recess); Herring v. New York, 422 U. S. 853 (1975) (bar on summation at
bench trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U. S. 605, 612-613
(1972) (requirement that defendant be first defense witness);
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U. S. 570, 593-596 (1961) (bar on
direct examination of defendant). Counsel, however, can
also deprive a defendant of the right to effective assistance,
simply by failing to render "adequate legal assistance," Cuyler v, Sullivan, 446 U. S., at 344. Id., at 345-350 (actual
conflict of interest adversely affecting lawyer's performance
renders assistance ineffective).
The Court has not elaborated on the meaning of the constitutional requirement of effective assistance in the latter
class of cases—that is, those presenting claims of "actual ineffectiveness." In giving meaning to the requirement, however, we must take its purpose—to ensure a fair trial—as the
guide. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.
The same principle applies to a capital sentencing proceeding such as that provided by Florida law. We need not consider the role of counsel in an ordinary sentencing, which may
involve informal proceedings and standardless discretion in
the sentencer, and hence may require a different approach to
the definition of constitutionally effective assistance. A capital sentencing proceeding like the one involved in this case,
however, is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format
and in the existence of standards for decision, see Barclay
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v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939, 952-954 (1983); Bullington v.
Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 (1981), that counsel's role in the
proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at trial—to ensure that the adversarial testing process works to produce
a just result under the standards governing decision. For
purposes of describing counsel's duties, therefore, Florida's
capital sentencing proceeding need not be distinguished from
an ordinarv trial.
Ill
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was
so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death
sentence has two components. First, the defendant must
show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both
showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a break J n in the adversary process
that renders the result unreliable.
A
As all the Federal Courts of Appeals have now held. :he
proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance. See Trapnell v. United States. 725
F. 2d, at 151-152. The Court indirectly recognized as much
when it stated in McMann v. Richardson, supra, at 770. 771.
that a guilty plea cannot be attacked as based on inadequate
legal advice unless counsel was not "a reasonably competent
attorney" and the advice was not "within the i*ange of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." See ai>o
Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 344. When a convicted ie-
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fendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
More specific guidelines are not appropriate. The Sixth
Amendment refers simply to "counsel," not specifying particular requirements of effective assistance. It relies instead
on the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient
to justify the law's presumption that counsel will fulfill the
role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions.
See Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 100-101 (1955). The
proper measure of attorney performance remains simply
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.
Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic
duties. Counsel's function is to assist the defendant, and
hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to
avoid conflicts of interest. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at
346. From counsel's function as assistant to the defendant
derive the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's
cause and the more particular duties to consult with the
defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant
informed of important developments in the course of the
prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such
skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S.,
at 68-69.
These basic duties neither exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of
attorney performance. In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether
counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in
American Bar Association standards and the like, e. g., ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980)
("The Defense Function"), are guides to determining what is
reasonable, but they are only guides. No particular set of
detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take
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account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense
counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how
best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of
rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected
independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions. See United
States v. Decoster, 199 U. S. App. D. C , at 371. 624 F. 2d.
at 208. Indeed, the existence of detailed guidelines for representation could distract counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant's cause. Moreover, the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of
the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal
representation, although that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system. The purpose is simply to ensure
that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to secondguess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's
defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that
a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.
Cf. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 183-134 (1982). A fair
assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight,
to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective
at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making
the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant mu>:
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstance-,
the challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy." See Michel v. Louisiana, supra, at 101. There are
countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given
case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would n<>:
defend a particular client in the same way. See Goodpaster.
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The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, 58 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 299, 343 (1983).
The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney
performance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would
encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges.
Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would
increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of
counsel's unsuccessful defense. Counsel's performance and
even willingness to serve could be adversely affected. Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of
assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney
and client.
Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must
judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on
the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of
counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine
whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts
or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance. In making that determination, the
court should keep in mind that counsel's function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case. At the
same time, the court should recognize that counsel is strongly
presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment.
These standards require no special amplification in order to
define counsel's duty to investigate, the duty at issue in this
case. As the Court of Appeals concluded, strategic choices
made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant
to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strate-
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gic choices made after less than complete investigation are
reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.
In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness
case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly
assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments.
The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined
or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually bashed, quite
properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depend.critically on such information. For example, when the factthat support a certain potential line of defense are Lreneralh
known to counsel because of what the defendant ha> .-aid. the
need for further investigation may be considerably diminished or eliminated altogether. And when a defendant ha.given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain m\ ('-ligations would be fruitless or even harmful, coun.-e:'- fai.ure
to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged a>
unreasonable. In short, inquiry into eoun-el'.- conversation.with the defendant may be critical to a proper a.-.-e-.-mer.: of
counsel's investigation decisions, just as it may be cntica. in
a proper assessment of counsel's other litigation decL-i<>n>
See United States v. Decoster. *upm. at 372-373. 624 F 2d.
at 209-210.
B
An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable.
does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. <"f. ('» '"<
States v. Morrison, 449 U. S. 361, 364-363 • 19M •. The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of coun.-e. ..- to ,.»>
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sure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify
reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any
deficiencies in counsel's performance must be prejudicial to
the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under
the Constitution.
In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed. Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of
counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice.
So are various kinds of state interference with counsel's
assistance. See United States v. Cronic, ante, at 659, and
n. 25. Prejudice in these circumstances is so likely that caseby-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost. Ante, at
658. Moreover, such circumstances involve impairments of
the Sixth Amendment right that are easy to identify and, for
that reason and because the prosecution is directly responsible,
easy for the government to prevent.
One type of actual ineffectiveness claim warrants a similar,
though more limited, presumption of prejudice. In Cuyler
v. Sullivan, 446 U. S., at 345-350, the Court held that prejudice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest. In those circumstances, counsel breaches
the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties. Moreover, it is difficult to measure the precise effect
on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting
interests. Given the obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts
of interest and the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry
in certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts, see, e. g.,
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 44(c), it is reasonable for the criminal
justice system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed
prejudice for conflicts of interest. Even so, the rule is not
quite the per se rule of prejudice that exists for the Sixth
Amendment claims mentioned above. Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel "actively represented conflicting interests" and that "an actual
conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 350, 348 (footnote
omitted).
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Conflict of interest claims aside, actual ineffectiveness
claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice. The government is not responsible
for, and hence not able to prevent, attorney errors that will
result in reversal of a conviction or sentence. Attorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly
harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial.
They cannot be classified according to likelihood of causing
prejudice. Nor can they be defined with sufficient precision
to inform defense attorneys correctly just what conduct to
avoid. Representation is an art, and an act or omission that
is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in
another. Even if a defendant shows that particular errors of
counsel were unreasonable, therefore, the defendant must
show that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense.
It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors
had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet
that test, cf. United States v. Valeyizaela-BeimaU 458 U. S.
858, 866-867 (1982), and not every error that conceivably
could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability
of the result of the proceeding. Respondent suggests requiring a showing that the errors "impaired the presentation
of the defense." Brief for Respondent 58. That standard,
however, provides no workable principle. Since any error,
if it is indeed an error, "impairs" the presentation of the defense, the proposed standard is inadequate because it provides no way of deciding what impairments are sufficiently serious to warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceeding.
On the other hand, we believe that a defendant need not
show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case. This outcome-determinative
standard has several strengths. It defines the relevant inquiry in a way familiar to courts, though the inquiry, as is
inevitable, is anything but precise. The standard also reflects the profound importance of finality in criminal proceed-
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ings. Moreover, it comports with the widely used standard
for assessing motions for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
19-20, and nn. 10, 11. Nevertheless, the standard is not
quite appropriate.
Even when the specified attorney error results in the omission of certain evidence, the newly discovered evidence
standard is not an apt source from which to draw a prejudice
standard for ineffectiveness claims. The high standard for
newly discovered evidence claims presupposes that all the
essential elements of a presumptively accurate and fair proceeding were present in the proceeding whose result is challenged. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 327 U. S. 106, 112
(1946). An ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence
of one of the crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding is reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker and
the appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat
lower. The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors
of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.
Accordingly, the appropriate test for prejudice finds its
roots in the test for materiality of exculpatory information
not disclosed to the defense by the prosecution, United States
v. Agurs, 427 U. S., at 104, 112-113, and in the test for materiality of testimony made unavailable to the defense by
Government deportation of a witness, United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, supra, at 872-874. The defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
In making the determination whether the specified errors
resulted in the required prejudice, a court should presume,
absent challenge to the judgment on grounds of evidentiary
insufficiency, that the judge or jury acted according to law.
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An assessment of the likelihood of a result more favorable to
the defendant must exclude the possibility of arbitrariness,
whimsy, caprice, "nullification," and the like. A defendant
has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker,
even if a lawless decision cannot be reviewed. The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the
decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially
applying the standards that govern the decision. It should
not depend on the idiosyncracies of the particular decisionmaker, such as unusual propensities toward harshness or leniency. Although these factors may actually have entered
into counsel's selection of strategies and, to that limited extent, may thus affect the performance inquiry, they are
irrelevant to the prejudice inquiry. Thus, evidence about
the actual process of decision, if not part of the record of the
proceeding under review, and evidence about, for example, a
particular judge's sentencing practices, should not be considered in the prejudice determination.
The governing legal standard plays a critical role in defining the question to be asked in assessing the prejudice from
counsel's errors. When a defendant challenges a conviction,
the question is whether there is a reasonable probability
that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a
reasonable doubt respecting guilt. When a defendant challenges a death sentence such as the one at issue in this case,
the question is whether there is a reasonable probability
that, absent the errors, the sentencer—including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence—would have concluded that the balance of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.
In making this determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. Some of the factual findings will have
been unaffected by the errors, and factual findings that were
affected will have been affected in different ways. Some
errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to
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be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary
picture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect.
Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by
the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than
one with overwhelming record support. Taking the unaffected findings as a given, and taking due account of the effect of the errors on the remaining findings, a court making
the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the
burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.
IV
A number of practical considerations are important for the
application of the standards we have outlined. Most important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have
stated do not establish mechanical rules. Although those
principles should guide the process of decision, the ultimate
focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding whose result is being challenged. In every case
the court should be concerned with whether, despite the
strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular
proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just
results.
To the extent that this has already been the guiding inquiry in the lower courts, the standards articulated today do
not require reconsideration of ineffectiveness claims rejected
under different standards. Cf. Trapnell v. United States,
725 F. 2d, at 153 (in several years of applying "farce and
mockery" standard along with Reasonable competence"
standard, court "never found that the result of a case hinged
on the choice of a particular standard"). In particular, the
minor differences in the lower courts' precise formulations
of the performance standard are insignificant: the different
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formulations are mere variations of the overarching reasonableness standard. With regard to the prejudice inquiry,
only the strict outcome-determinative test, among the standards articulated in the lower courts, imposes a heavier burden on defendants than the tests laid down today. The difference, however, should alter the merit of an ineffectiveness
claim only in the rarest case.
Although we have discussed the performance component of
an ineffectiveness claim prior to the prejudice component.
there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assurance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or e\ en
to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant
makes an insufficient showing on one. In particular, a court
need not determine whether counsel's performance wa> dericient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object <>f an
ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counselV performance
If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on thtground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expec: wn.
often be so, that course should be followed. Court?- >|,itiiiii
strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not becor:e -..
burdensome to defense counsel that the entire cnmina. LL—
tice system suffers as a result.
The principles governing ineffectiveness chum- >:.'>uid
apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do «»n «::rec*
appeal or in motions for a new trial. As indicated b;. :he
"cause and prejudice" test for overcoming procedural wa/. erof claims of error, the presumption that a criminal ;udtr^en:
is final is at its strongest in collateral attacks on that .dement. See United States v. Fradi/, 456 U. S. 152. 162-16H
(1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126-125* «19*2» Ar.
ineffectiveness claim, however, as our articulation <»: 'Hestandards that govern decision of such claims marits L.t-ar
is an attack on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding
whose result is challenged. Since fundamental faime — the central concern of the writ of habeas corniL-, -*- '
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at 126, no special standards ought to apply to ineffectiveness
claims made in habeas proceedings.
Finally, in a federal habeas challenge to a state criminal
judgment, a state court conclusion that counsel rendered effective assistance is not a finding of fact binding on the federal court to the extent stated by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). Ineffectiveness is not a question of "basic, primary, or historical
facft]," Toumsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 309, n. 6 (1963).
Rather, like the question whether multiple representation in
a particular case gave rise to a conflict of interest, it is a
mixed question of law and fact. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U. S., at 342. Although state court findings of fact made in
the course of deciding an ineffectiveness claim are subject to
the deference requirement of § 2254(d), and although district
court findings are subject to the clearly erroneous standard
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), both the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry
are mixed questions of law and fact.
V
Having articulated general standards for judging ineffectiveness claims, we think it useful to apply those standards to
the facts of this case in order to illustrate the meaning of the
general principles. The record makes it possible to do so.
There are no conflicts between the state and federal courts
over findings of fact, and the principles we have articulated
are sufficiently close to the principles applied both in the
Florida courts and in the District Court that it is clear that
the factfinding was not affected by erroneous legal principles.
See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 291-292
(1982).
Application of the governing principles is not difficult in
this case. The facts as described above, see supra, at 671678, make clear that the conduct of respondent's counsel at and
before respondent's sentencing proceeding cannot be found
unreasonable. They also make clear that, even assuming the
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challenged conduct of counsel was unreasonable, respondent
suffered insufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside his
death sentence.
With respect to the performance component, the record
shows that respondent's counsel made a strategic choice to
argue for the extreme emotional distress mitigating circumstance and to rely as fully as possible on respondent's acceptance of responsibility for his crimes. Although counsel understandably felt hopeless about respondent's prospects, see
App. 383-384, 400-401, nothing in the record indicates, as
one possible reading of the District Court's opinion suggests,
see App. to Pet. for Cert. A282, that counsel's sense of hopelessness distorted his professional judgment.
Counsel's
strategy choice was well within the range of professionally
reasonable judgments, and the decision not to seek more
character or psychological evidence than was already in hand
was likewise reasonable.
The trial judge's views on the importance of owning up to
one's crimes were well known to counsel. The aggravating
circumstances were utterly overwhelming. Trial counsel
could reasonably surmise from his conversations with respondent that character and psychological evidence w ould be
of little help. Respondent had already been able to mention
at the plea colloquy the substance of what there was to know
about his financial and emotional troubles. Restricting testimony on respondent's character to what had come in at the
plea colloquy ensured that contrary character and psychological evidence and respondent's criminal history, which counsel
had successfully moved to exclude, would not come in. On
these facts, there can be little question, even without application of the presumption of adequate performance, that trial
counsel's defense, though unsuccessful, was the result of reasonable professional judgment.
With respect to the prejudice component, the lack of merit
of respondent's claim is even more stark. The evidence that
respondent says his trial counsel should have offered at the

700

STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON

OCTOBER TERM, 1983
Opinion of the Court

466 U. S.

sentencing hearing would barely have altered the sentencing
profile presented to the sentencing judge. As the state
courts and District Court found, at most this evidence shows
that numerous people who knew respondent thought he was
generally a good person and that a psychiatrist and a psychologist believed he was under considerable emotional
stress that did not rise to the level of extreme disturbance.
Given the overwhelming aggravating factors, there is no
reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have
changed the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances and, hence, the
sentence imposed. Indeed, admission of the evidence respondent now offers might even have been harmful to his
case: his "rap sheet" would probably have been admitted into
evidence, and the psychological reports would have directly
contradicted respondent's claim that the mitigating circumstance of extreme emotional disturbance applied to his case.
Our conclusions on both the prejudice and performance
components of the ineffectiveness inquiry do not depend on
the trial judge's testimony at the District Court hearing.
We therefore need not consider the general admissibility of
that testimony, although, as noted supra, at 695, that testimony is irrelevant to the prejudice inquiry. Moreover, the
prejudice question is resolvable, and hence the ineffectiveness claim can be rejected, without regard to the evidence
presented at the District Court hearing. The state courts
properly concluded that the ineffectiveness claim was meritless without holding an evidentiary hearing.
Failure to make the required showing of either deficient
performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim. Here there is a double failure. More generally,
respondent has made no showing that the justice of his sentence was rendered unreliable by a breakdown in the adversary process caused by deficiencies in counsel's assistance.
Respondent's sentencing proceeding was not fundamentally
unfair.
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We conclude, therefore, that the District Court properly
declined to issue a writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Reversed.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I join the Court's opinion but dissent from its judgment.
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), I would
vacate respondent's death sentence and remand the case for
further proceedings.1
1
The Court's judgment leaves standing another in an increasing number
of capital sentences purportedly imposed in compliance with the procedural
standards developed in cases beginning with Gregg v. Georgia. 428 U. S.
153 (1976>. Earlier this Term, I reiterated my view that these procedural
requirements have proven unequal to the task of eliminating the irrationality that necessarily attends decisions by juries, trial judges, and appellate
courts whether to take or spare human life. Pulley v. Hams. 465 U. S.
37, 59 (1984) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). The inherent difficulty in imposing the ultimate sanction consistent with the rule of law. see Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 274-277 (1972) (BRENNAN. J., concurring;:
McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 248-312 (1971) (BRENNAN. J.,
dissenting), is confirmed by the extraordinary pressure put on our own
deliberations in recent months by the growing number of applications to
stay executions. See Wainurright v. Adams, post, at 965 (MARSHALL. J.,
dissenting) (stating that "haste and confusion surrounding . . . decision [to vacate stay] is degrading to our role as judges"1*: Autry v.
McKaskle, 465 U. S. 1085 (1984) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (criticizing
Court for "dramatically expediting its normal deliberative processes to
clear the way for an impending execution"): Stephens v. Kemp. 464 U. S.
1027, 1032 (1983) (POWELL, J., dissenting) (contending that procedures by
which stay applications are considered "undermines public confidence in
the courts and in the laws we are required to follow"): Sullivan v. Wainwright, 464 U. S. 109, 112 (1983) (BURGER. C. J., concurring; (accusing
lawyers seeking review of their client's death sentences of turning "the
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I
This case and United States v. Cronic, ante, p. 648,
present our first occasions to elaborate the appropriate
standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. In Cronic, the Court considers such claims in the
context of cases "in which the surrounding circumstances
[make] it so unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance that ineffectiveness [is] properly presumed
without inquiry into actual performance at trial," ante, at
661. This case, in contrast, concerns claims of ineffective
assistance based on allegations of specific errors by counsel—
claims which, by their very nature, require courts to evaluate
both the attorney's performance and the effect of that performance on the reliability and fairness of the proceeding.
Accordingly, a defendant making a claim of this kind must
show not only that his lawyer's performance was inadequate
but also that he was prejudiced thereby. See also Cronic,
ante, at 659, n. 26.
I join the Court's opinion because I believe that the standards it sets out today will both provide helpful guidance to
courts considering claims of actual ineffectiveness of counsel
and also permit those courts to continue their efforts to achieve
progressive development of this area of the law. Like all
federal courts and most state courts that have previously addressed the matter, see ante, at 683-684, the Court concludes
that "the proper standard for attorney performance is that
of reasonably effective assistance." Ante, at 687. And,
administration of justice into [a] sporting contest"); Autry v. Estelle,
464 U. S. 1, 6 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Court's
practice in reviewing applications in death cases 'injects uncertainty and
disparity into the review procedure, adds to the burdens of counsel, distorts the deliberative process within this Court, and increases the risk of
error"). It is difficult to believe that the decision whether to put an individual to death generates any less emotional pressure among juries, trial
judges, and appellate courts than it does among Members of this Court.
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rejecting the strict "outcome-determinative" test employed
by some courts, the Court adopts as the appropriate standard for prejudice a requirement that the defendant "show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different," defining a "reasonable probability"
as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Ante, at 694. I believe these standards are
sufficiently precise to permit meaningful distinctions between
those attorney derelictions that deprive defendants of their
constitutional rights and those that do not; at the same time,
the standards are sufficiently flexible to accommodate the
wide variety of situations giving rise to claims of this kind.
With respect to the performance standard, I agree with
the Court's conclusion that a "particular set of detailed rules
for counsel's conduct" would be inappropriate. Ante, at 6SS.
Precisely because the standard of "reasonably effective assistance" adopted today requires that counsel's performance
be measured in light of the particular circumstances of the
case, I do not believe our decision "will stunt the development of constitutional doctrine in this area," post, at 709
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Court's suggestion
that today's decision is largely consistent with the approach
taken by the lower courts, ante, at 696, simply indicates that
those courts may continue to develop governing principles on
a case-by-case basis in the common-law tradition, as they have
in the past. Similarly, the prejudice standard announced
today does not erect an insurmountable obstacle to meritorious claims, but rather simply requires courts carefully
to examine trial records in light of both the nature and seriousness of counsel's errors and their effect in the particular
circumstances of the case. Ante, at 695.2
2
Indeed, counsel's incompetence can be so serious that it rises .to the
level of a constructive denial of counsel which can constitute constitutional
error without any showing of prejudice. See Cronic, ante, at 659-660;
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II
Because of their flexibility and the requirement that they
be considered in light of the particular circumstances of the
case, the standards announced today can and should be
applied with concern for the special considerations that
must attend review of counsel's performance in a capital sentencing proceeding. In contrast to a case in which a finding
of ineffective assistance requires a new trial, a conclusion
that counsel was ineffective with respect to only the penalty
phase of a capital trial imposes on the State the far lesser
burden of reconsideration of the sentence alone. On the
other hand, the consequences to the defendant of incompetent assistance at a capital sentencing could not, of course,
be greater. Recognizing the unique seriousness of such a
proceeding, we have repeatedly emphasized that "'where
discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave
as the determination of whether a human life should be taken
or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action.'" Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862,
874 (1983) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 188-189
(opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.)).
For that reason, we have consistently required that capital
proceedings be policed at all stages by an especially vigilant
concern for procedural fairness and for the accuracy of factfinding. As JUSTICE MARSHALL emphasized last Term:
"This Court has always insisted that the need for procedural safeguards is particularly great where life is at
stake. Long before the Court established the right to
counsel in all felony cases, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U. S. 335 (1963), it recognized that right in capital cases,
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 71-72 (1932). Time
Javor v. United States, 724 F. 2d 831, 834 (CA9 1984) ("Prejudice is inherent in this case because unconscious or sleeping counsel is equivalent to no
counsel at all").
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and again the Court has condemned procedures in capital
cases that might be completely acceptable in an ordinary
case. See, e. g., Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430
(1981); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625 (1980); Green v.
Georgia, 442 U. S. 95 (1979) (per curiam); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430
U. S. 349 (1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S.
280 (1976). . . .
"Because of th[e] basic difference between the death
penalty and all other punishments, this Court has consistently recognized that there is 'a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.'
Ibid:1 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 913-914 (1983)
(dissenting opinion).
See also id., at 924 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). In short,
this Court has taken special care to minimize the possibility
that death sentences are "imposed out of whim, passion,
prejudice, or mistake." Eddnigs v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S.
104, 118 (1982) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring).

In the sentencing phase of a capital case, "[w]hat is essential is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must
determine." Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 276 (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). For that
reason, we have repeatedly insisted that "the sentencer in
capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S.. at 112.
In fact, as JUSTICE O'CONNOR has noted, a sentencing
judge's failure to consider relevant aspects of a defendant's
character and background creates such an unacceptable risk
that the death penalty was unconstitutionally imposed that,
even in cases where the matter was not raised below, the
"interests of justice" may impose on reviewing courts "a duty
'to remand [the] case for resentencing." Id., at 117, n., and
119 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring).
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Of course, "[t]he right to present, and to have the sentencer consider, any and all mitigating evidence means little
if defense counsel fails to look for mitigating evidence or fails
to present a case in mitigation at the capital sentencing hearing." Comment, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1544, 1549 (1983). See,
e. g., Burger v. Zant, 718 F. 2d 979 (CAll 1983) (defendant,
17 years old at time of crime, sentenced to death after counsel
failed to present any evidence in mitigation), stay granted,
post, at 902. Accordingly, counsel's general duty to investigate, ante, at 690, takes on supreme importance to a defendant in the context of developing mitigating evidence to
present to a judge or jury considering the sentence of death;
claims of ineffective assistance in the performance of that
duty should therefore be considered with commensurate
care.
That the Court rejects the ineffective-assistance claim in
this case should not, of course, be understood to reflect any
diminution in commitment to the principle that " 'the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record
of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the
process of inflicting the penalty of death.'" Eddings v.
Oklahoma, supra, at 112 (quoting Woodson v. Noiih Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 304 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL,
and STEVENS, JJ.)). I am satisfied that the standards announced today will go far towards assisting lower federal
courts and state courts in discharging their constitutional
duty to ensure that every criminal defendant receives the
effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.
dissenting.
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a person accused of a crime the right to the aid of a lawyer in preparing and presenting his defense. Tf lias long been settled
that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assist-
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ance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759.
771, n. 14 (1970). The state and lower federal courts have
developed standards for distinguishing effective from inadequate assistance.1 Today, for the first time, this Court attempts to synthesize and clarify those standards. For the
most part, the majority's efforts are unhelpful. Neither of
its two principal holdings seems to me likely to improve the
adjudication of Sixth Amendment claims. And, in its zeal to
survey comprehensively this field of doctrine, the majority
makes many other generalizations and suggestions that I find
unacceptable. Most importantly, the majority fails to take
adequate account of the fact that the locus of this case is a
capital sentencing proceeding. Accordingly, I join neither
the Court's opinion nor its judgment.
I
The opinion of the Court revolves around two holdings
First, the majority ties the constitutional minima of attorney
performance to a simple "standard of reasonableness"
Ante, at 688. Second, the majority holds that only an errnr
of counsel that has sufficient impact on a trial to "undermine
confidence in the outcome" is grounds for overtumine a conviction. Ante, at 694. I disagree with both of the>e ruiimr>
A
My objection to the performance standard adopted by :he
Court is that it is so malleable that, in practice, it will either
have no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the
manner in which the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and
applied by different courts. To tell lawyers and the lower
courts that counsel for a criminal defendant must behave

JUSTICE MARSHALL,

' See Note Identifying and Remedying Ineffec::\e A . - ^ u r x v >i'"- m.nal Defense Counsel: A New Look After ['nittn <ta'>< \ D*^>-'>r "'.
Han-. L. Rev. 752, 756-758 < 1°M)). Note. E:Tect;\e A.-L-tar.c- :' r . „ - The Sixth Amendment and the Fair Trial Guarantee. '** L" « ~. L H-»
1380. 1386-13^7, 1399-1401. lli)>-14W t 1 < ^ I
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"reasonably" and must act like "a reasonably competent attorney," ante, at 687, is to tell them almost nothing. In
essence, the majority has instructed judges called upon to
assess claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to advert
to their own intuitions regarding what constitutes "professional" representation, and has discouraged them from trying
to develop more detailed standards governing the performance of defense counsel. In my view, the Court has thereby
not only abdicated its own responsiblity to interpret the Constitution, but also impaired the ability of the lower courts to
exercise theirs.
The debilitating ambiguity of an "objective standard of reasonableness" in this context is illustrated by the majority's
failure to address important issues concerning the quality
of representation mandated by the Constitution. It is an
unfortunate but undeniable fact that a person of means, by
selecting a lawyer and paying him enough to ensure he prepares thoroughly, usually can obtain better representation
than that available to an indigent defendant, who must rely
on appointed counsel, who, in turn, has limited time and resources to devote to a given case. Is a "reasonably competent attorney" a reasonably competent adequately paid retained lawyer or a reasonably competent appointed attorney?
It is also a fact that the quality of representation available to
ordinary defendants in different parts of the country varies
significantly. Should the standard of performance mandated
by the Sixth Amendment vary by locale?2 The majority offers no clues as to the proper responses to these questions.
The majority defends its refusal to adopt more specific
standards primarily on the ground that "[n]o particular set of
detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take ac2
Cf., e. g.f Moore v. United States, 432 F. 2d 730, 736 (CA3 1970) (defining the constitutionally required level of performance as "the exercise of
the customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and
place"). "
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count of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to
represent a criminal defendant." Ante, at 688-689. I agree
that counsel must be afforded "wide latitude" when making
"tactical decisions" regarding trial strategy, see ante, at 689;
cf. infra, at 712, 713, but many aspects of the job of a criminal
defense attorney are more amenable to judicial oversight.
For example, much of the work involved in preparing for a
trial, applying for bail, conferring with one's client, making
timely objections to significant, arguably erroneous rulings of
the trial judge, and filing a notice of appeal if there are colorable grounds therefor could profitably be made the subject of
uniform standards.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case represents
one sound attempt to develop particularized standards designed to ensure that all defendants receive effective legal
assistance. See 693 F. 2d 1243, 1251-1258 (CAS 1982) (en
banc). For other, generally consistent efforts, see United
States v. Decoster, 159 U. S. App. D. C. 326, 333-334, 487
F. 2d 1197, 1203-1204 (1973), disapproved on rehearing, 199
U. S. App. D. C. 359, 624 F. 2d 196 (en banc), cert, denied.
444 U. S. 944 (1979); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F. 2d 224, 226
(CA4), cert, denied, 393 U. S. 849 (1968); People v. Pope, 23
Cal. 3d 412, 424-425, 590 P. 2d 859, 866 (1979); State v.
Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 550-557, 205 N. W. 2d 1, 6-9 (1973).:
By refusing to address the merits of these proposals, and
indeed suggesting that no such effort is worthwhile, the
opinion of the Court, I fear, will stunt the development of
constitutional doctrine in this area.
3
For a review of other decisions attempting to develop guidelines for
assessment of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, see Erickson.
Standards of Competency for Defense Counsel in a Criminal Case. 17 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 233, 242-248 (1979). Many of these decisions rely heavily
on the standards developed by the American Bar Association. See ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1—4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980).
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B
I object to the prejudice standard adopted by the Court for
two independent reasons. First, it is often very difficult to
tell whether a defendant convicted after a trial in which he
was ineffectively represented would have fared better if his
lawyer had been competent. Seemingly impregnable cases
can sometimes be dismantled by good defense counsel. On
the basis of a cold record, it may be impossible for a reviewing court confidently to ascertain how the government's evidence and arguments would have stood up against rebuttal
and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-prepared lawyer.
The difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact are exacerbated by the possibility that evidence of injury to the defendant may be missing from the record precisely because of
the incompetence of defense counsel.4 In view of all these
impediments to a fair evaluation of the probability that the
outcome of a trial was affected by ineffectiveness of counsel,
it seems to me senseless to impose on a defendant whose lawyer has been shown to have been incompetent the burden of
demonstrating prejudice.
4
Cf. United States v. Ellison, 557 F. 2d 128, 131 (CA7 1977). In discussing the related problem of measuring injury caused by joint representation of conflicting interests, we observed:
"{TJhe e v i l . . . is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain
from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process. It may be possible in some cases to
identify from the record the prejudice resulting from an attorney's failure
to undertake certain trial tasks, but even with a record of the sentencing
hearing available it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of
a conflict on the attorney's representation of a client. And to assess the
impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike most cases,
unguided speculation." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475, 490-491
(1978) (emphasis in original).
When defense counsel fails to take certain actions, not because he is "compelled" to do so, but because he is incompetent, it is <n*>n equally difficult
to ascertain the prejudice consequent upon his omissions.
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Second and more fundamentally, the assumption on which
the Court's holding rests is that the only purpose of the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is to
reduce the chance that innocent persons will be convicted.
In my view, the guarantee also functions to ensure that convictions are obtained only through fundamentally fair procedures.5 The majority contends that the Sixth Amendment is
not violated when a manifestly guilty defendant is convicted
after a trial in which he was represented by a manifestly ineffective attorney. I cannot agree. Every defendant is entitled to a trial in which his interests are vigorously and conscientiously advocated by an able lawyer. A proceeding in
which the defendant does not receive meaningful assistance
in meeting the forces of the State does not, in my opinion,
constitute due process.
In Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 23 (1967), we
acknowledged that certain constitutional rights are "so basic
to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as
harmless error." Among these rights is the right to the
assistance of counsel at trial. Id., at 23, n. 8; see Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963).6 In my view, the right
5

See United States v. Decoster, 199 U. S. App. D. C. 359, 454-457. 624
F. 2d 196, 291-294 (en banc) (Bazelon, J., dissenting), cert, denied, 444
U. S. 944 (1979); Note, 93 Harv. L. Rev., at 767-770.
6
In cases in which the government acted in a wav that prevented defense
counsel from functioning effectively, we have refused to require the defendant, in order to obtain a new trial, to demonstrate that he was injured.
In Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 75-76 (1942), for example, we
held:
"To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by [a defendant]
as a result of the court's appointment of [the same counsel for two codefendants with conflicting interests] is at once difficult and unnecessary. The
right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to
allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice
arising from its denial."
As the Court today acknowledges, United States v. Cronic, ante, at
662, n. 31, whether the government or counsel himself is to blame for the
inadequacy of the legal assistance received by a defendant should make no
difference in deciding whether the defendant must prove prejudice.
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to effective assistance of counsel is entailed by the right to
counsel, and abridgment of the former is equivalent to
abridgment of the latter.7 I would thus hold that a showing that the performance of a defendant's lawyer departed
from constitutionally prescribed standards requires a new
trial regardless of whether the defendant suffered demonstrable prejudice thereby.
II
Even if I were inclined to join the majority's two central
holdings, I could not abide the manner in which the majority
elaborates upon its rulings. Particularly regrettable are the
majority's discussion of the "presumption" of reasonableness
to be accorded lawyers' decisions and its attempt to prejudge
the merits of claims previously rejected by lower courts using
different legal standards.
A
In defining the standard of attorney performance required
by the Constitution, the majority appropriately notes that
many problems confronting criminal defense attorneys admit
of "a range of legitimate" responses. Ante, at 689. And the
majority properly cautions courts, when reviewing a lawyer's
selection amongst a set of options, to avoid the hubris of hindsight. Ibid. The majority goes on, however, to suggest
that reviewing courts should "indulge a strong presumption
that counsel's conduct" was constitutionally acceptable, ibid.;
see ante, at 690, 696, and should "applfy] a heavy measure of
deference to counsel's judgments," ante, at 691.
I am not sure what these phrases mean, and I doubt that
they will be self-explanatory to lower courts. If they denote
nothing more than that a defendant claiming he was denied
effective assistance of counsel has the burden of proof, I
7
See United States v. Yelardy, 567 F. 2d 863, 865, n. 1 (CA6), cert.
denied, 439 U. S. 842 (1978); Beasley v. United States, 491 F. 2d 687, 696
(CA6 1974); Commonwealth v. Badger, 482 Pa. 240, 243-244, 393 A. 2d
642, 644 (1978).
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would agree. See United States v. Cronic, ante, at 658.
But the adjectives "strong" and "heavy" might be read as
imposing upon defendants an unusually weighty burden of
persuasion. If that is the majority's intent, I must respectfully dissent. The range of acceptable behavior defined by
"prevailing professional norms," ante, at 688, seems to me
sufficiently broad to allow defense counsel the flexibility they
need in responding to novel problems of trial strategy. To
afford attorneys more latitude, by "strongly presuming" that
their behavior will fall within the zone of reasonableness, is
covertly to legitimate convictions and sentences obtained on
the basis of incompetent conduct by defense counsel.
The only justification the majority itself provides for its
proposed presumption is that undue receptivity to claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel would encourage too many
defendants to raise such claims and thereby would clog the
courts with frivolous suits and "dampen the ardor" of defense
counsel. See ante, at 690. I have more confidence than the
majority in the ability of state and federal courts expeditiously to dispose of meritless arguments and to ensure that
responsible, innovative lawyering is not inhibited. In my
view, little will be gained and much may be lost by instructing the lower courts to proceed on the assumption that a
defendant's challenge to his lawyer's performance will be
insubstantial.
B
For many years the lower courts have been debating the
meaning of "effective" assistance of counsel.
Different
courts have developed different standards. On the issue of
the level of performance required by the Constitution, some
courts have adopted the forgiving "farce-and-mockery"
standard, 8 while others have adopted various versions of
8

See, e. g., State v. Pacheco, 121 Ariz. 88, 91, 588 P. 2d 830, 833 (1978);
Hoover v. State, 270 Ark. 978, 980, 606 S. W. 2d 749, 751 (1980); Line v.
State, 272 Ind. 353, 354-355, 397 N. E. 2d 975, 976 (1979).
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the "reasonable competence" standard. On the issue of
the level of prejudice necessary to compel a new trial, the
courts have taken a wide variety of positions, ranging from
the stringent "outcome-determinative" test,10 to the rule that
a showing of incompetence on the part of defense counsel
automatically requires reversal of the conviction regardless
of the injury to the defendant.11
The Court today substantially resolves these disputes.
The majority holds that the Constitution is violated when defense counsel's representation falls below the level expected
of reasonably competent defense counsel, ante, at 687-691,
and so affects the trial that there is a "reasonable probability"
that, absent counsel's error, the outcome would have been
different, ante, at 691-696.
Curiously, though, the Court discounts the significance of
its rulings, suggesting that its choice of standards matters
little and that few if any cases would have been decided
differently if the lower courts had always applied the tests
announced today. See ante, at 696-697. Surely the judges
in the state and lower federal courts will be surprised to learn
that the distinctions they have sofiercelydebated for many
years are in fact unimportant.
The majority's comments on this point seem to be
prompted principally by a reluctance to acknowledge that today's decision will require a reassessment of many previously
rejected ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The majority's unhappiness on this score is understandable, but its
efforts to mitigate the perceived problem will be ineffectual.
Nothing the majority says can relieve lower courts that hith9

See, e. g., Trapnell v. United States, 725 F. 2d 149, 155 (CA2 1983);
Cooper v. Fitzharns, 586 F. 2d 1325,1328-1330 (CA9 1978) (en banc), cert,
denied, 440 U. S. 974 (1979).
10
See, e. g., United States v. Decoster, 199 U. S. App. D. C , at 370, and
IL 74, 624 F. 2d, at 208, and n. 74 (plurality opinion); Knight v. State, 394
So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 1981).
u
See n. 7, supra.
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erto have been using standards more tolerant of ineffectual
advocacy of their obligation to scrutinize all claims, old as
well as new, under the principles laid down today.
Ill
The majority suggests that, "[f ]or purposes of describing
counsel's duties," a capital sentencing proceeding "need not
be distinguished from an ordinary trial." Ante, at 687. I
cannot agree.
The Court has repeatedly acknowledged that the Constitution requires stricter adherence to procedural safeguards in a
capital case than in other cases.
"[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a
sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its
finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a
100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or
two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is
a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in
the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U. S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (footnote
omitted).12
The performance of defense counsel is a crucial component
of the system of protections designed to ensure that capital
punishment is administered with some degree of rationality.
"Reliability" in the imposition of the death sentence can be
approximated only if the sentencer is fully informed of "all
possible relevant information about the individual defendant
whose fate it must determine." Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S.
262, 276 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS,
JJ.). The job of amassing that information and presenting it
12
See also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 884-885 (1983); Eddings v
Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 110-112 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586.
604 (1978) (plurality opinion).
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in an organized and persuasive manner to the sentencer is
entrusted principally to the defendant's lawyer. The importance to the process of counsel's efforts,13 combined with
the severity and irrevocability of the sanction at stake, require that the standards for determining what constitutes
"effective assistance" be applied especially stringently in
capital sentencing proceedings.14
It matters little whether strict scrutiny of a claim that
ineffectiveness of counsel resulted in a death sentence
is achieved through modification of the Sixth Amendment
standards or through especially careful application of those
standards. JUSTICE BRENNAN suggests that the necessary
adjustment of the level of performance required of counsel in
capital sentencing proceedings can be effected simply by construing the phrase, "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms," in a manner that takes into account the nature
of the impending penalty. Ante, at 704-706. Though I
would prefer a more specific iteration of counsel's duties in
this special context,161 can accept that proposal. However,
when instructing lower courts regarding the probability of
impact upon the outcome that requires a resentencing, I think
the Court would do best explicitly to modify the legal standard itself.16 In my view, a person on death row, whose counsel's performance fell below constitutionally acceptable levels,
should not be compelled to demonstrate a "reasonable probu

See Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 299, 303 (1983).
14
As JUSTICE BRENNAN points out, ante, at 704, an additional reason
for examining especially carefully a Sixth Amendment challenge when it
pertains to a capital sentencing proceeding is that the result offindinga
constitutional violation in that context is less disruptive than a finding
that counsel was incompetent in the liability phase of a trial.
14
See Part I-A, supra. For a sensible effort to formulate guidelines
for the conduct of defense counsel in capital sentencing proceedings, see
Goodpaster, supra, at 343-345, 360-362.
w
For the purposes of this and the succeeding section, I assume, solely
for the sake of argument, that some showing of prejudice is necessary to
state a violation of the Sixth Amendment. But cf. Part I-B, supra.
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ability" that he would have been given a life sentence if his
lawyer had been competent, see ante, at 694; if the defendant
can establish a significant chance that the outcome would
have been different, he surely should be entitled to a redetermination of his fate. Cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S.
97, 121-122 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).17
IV
The views expressed in the preceding section oblige me to
dissent from the majority's disposition of the case before us.18
It is undisputed that respondent's trial counsel made virtually no investigation of the possibility of obtaining testimony
from respondent's relatives, friends, or former employers
pertaining to respondent's character or background. Had
counsel done so, he would have found several persons willing
and able to testify that, in their experience, respondent was
a responsible, nonviolent man, devoted to his family, and
active in the affairs of his church. See App. 338-365. Respondent contends that his lawyer could have and should
have used that testimony to "humanize" respondent, to counteract the impression conveyed by the trial that he was little
more than a cold-blooded killer. Had this evidence been
admitted, respondent argues, his chances of obtaining a life
sentence would have been significantly better.
17
As I read the opinion of the Court, it does not preclude this kind of
adjustment of the legal standard. The majority defines "reasonable probability" as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Ante, at 694. In view of the nature of the sanction at issue, and
the difficulty of determining how a sentencer would have responded if presented with a different set of facts, it could be argued that a lower estimate
of the likelihood that the outcome of a capital sentencing proceeding was
influenced by attorney error is sufficient to Undermine confidence" in that
outcome than would be true in an ordinary criminal case.
a
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is unconstitutional under
all circumstances, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (MARSHALL,
J., dissenting), I would vote to vacate respondent's sentence even if he had
not presented a substantial Sixth Amendment claim.
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Measured against the standards outlined above, respondent's contentions are substantial. Experienced members of
the death-penalty bar have long recognized the crucial importance of adducing evidence at a sentencing proceeding that
establishes the defendant's social and familial connections.
See Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 299,
300-303, 334-335 (1983). The State makes a colorable—
though in my view not compelling—argument that defense
counsel in this case might have made a reasonable "strategic"
decision not to present such evidence at the sentencing hearing on the assumption that an unadorned acknowledgment of
respondent's responsibility for his crimes would be more
likely to appeal to the trial judge, who was reputed to respect
persons who accepted responsiblity for their actions.19 But
however justifiable such a choice might have been after counsel had fairly assessed the potential strength of the mitigating evidence available to him, counsel's failure to make any
significant effort to find out what evidence might be garnered
from respondent's relatives and acquaintances surely cannot
be described as "reasonable." Counsel's failure to investigate is particularly suspicious in light of his candid admission
that respondent's confessions and conduct in the course of
the trial gave him a feeling of "hopelessness" regarding the
possibility of saving respondent's life, see App. 383-384,
400-401.
19
Two considerations undercut the State's explanation of counsel's decision. First, it is not apparent why adducement of evidence pertaining to
respondent's character and familial connections would have been inconsistent with respondent's acknowledgment that he was responsible for his behavior. Second, the Florida Supreme Court possesses—and frequently
exercises—the power to overturn death sentences it deems unwarranted
by the facts of a case. See State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (1973). Even
if counsel's decision not to try to humanize respondent for the benefit of the
trial judge were deemed reasonable, counsel's failure to create a record for
the benefit of the State Supreme Court might well be deemed unreasonable.
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That the aggravating circumstances implicated by respondent's criminal conduct were substantial, see ante, at
700, does not vitiate respondent's constitutional claim; judges
and juries in cases involving behavior at least as egregious
have shown mercy, particularly when afforded an opportunity to see other facets of the defendant's personality
and life.20 Nor is respondent's contention defeated by the
possibility that the material his counsel turned up might
not have been sufficient to establish a statutory mitigating
circumstance under Florida law; Florida sentencing judges
and the Florida Supreme Court sometimes refuse to impose
death sentences in cases "in which, even though statutory
mitigating circumstances do not outweigh statutory aggravating circumstances, the addition of nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances tips the scales in favor of life imprisonment."
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939, 964 (1983) (STEVENS, J..
concurring in judgment) (emphasis in original).
If counsel had investigated the availability of mitigating
evidence, he might well have decided to present some such
material at the hearing. If he had done so, there is a significant chance that respondent would have been given a life
sentence. In my view, those possibilities, conjoined with
the unreasonableness of counsel's failure to investigate, are
more than sufficient to establish a violation of the Sixth
Amendment and to entitle respondent to a new sentencing
proceeding.
I respectfully dissent.

"See, e. g., Farmer & Kinard, The Trial of the Penalty Phase (1976).
reprinted in 2 California State Public Defender, California Death Penalty
Manual N-33, N-45 (1980).

